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The purpose of this thesis is to present a brief history of Turkish-Israeli 
relations, to display the essence and motives of these relations, and to explain 
the repercussions of the rapprochement between the two countries in the Middle 
East. The first chapter of this thesis presents information pertaining to Turkish· 
Israeli relations before and after the 1990s. Following an account of the 
relations between Turks and Jews in history, this chapter includes a brief 
history of the Turkish-Israeli relations from the establishment of Israel. It also 
analyses the important changes in the 1990s and gives details about high level 
visits between the two countries. The second chapter shows that there are 
several advantages that both Jerusalem and Ankara gain as a result of their 
growing closeness. This chapter focuses on the reasons why Israel and Turkey 
signed military agreements and cooperated in various areas. It also includes the 
essence of the relations and what the components of this relationship are. The 
third chapter presents an analysis of the repercussions of the developing 
relations between Turkey and Israel. It analyses how this rapprochement 
affected the course of Middle Eastern politics at the end of the twentieth 
century. This chapter also provides information about the reactions of some 
regional states to Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. Finally, the conclusion part of 
the study includes an overview of the ideas employed within the previous 
chapters and it also predicts what the future holds for this relationship.
ABSTRACT
Ill
ÖZET
Bu tezin amacı Türk-İsrail ilişkilerinin kısa bir tarihçesini sunmak, 
gelişen ilişkilerin nedenlerini ve esaslarını göstermek ve iki ülke arasındaki 
yakınlaşmanın Ortadoğu’daki yankılarını açıklamaktır. Tezin ilk bölümü 1990 
yılı öncesi ve sonrası Türk-İsrail ilişkileri hakkında bilgi vermektedir. Bu 
bölümde tarihte Türkler ve Yahudiler arasındaki ilişkiler kısaca anlatıldıktan 
sonra İsrail Devletinin kurulmasından sonraki Türk-İsrail ilişkileri 
özetlenmiştir. Bu bölümde ayrıca 1990 sonrası dünyadaki önemli gelişmeler ve 
iki ülke arasındaki ziyaretler de yer almaktadır. İkinci bölümde Ankara ve Tel 
Aviv arasındaki gelişen ilişkilerden iki ülkenin ne gibi avantajlar elde ettiği 
gösterilmiştir. Bu bölümde ayrıca Türkiye ve İsrail’in neden birçok alanda 
dayanışmaya gittiği ve askeri anlaşmalar imzaladığı konulan üzerinde 
durulmuştur. Bu bölüm ayrıca ilişkilerin nedenlerini ve esaslarını da 
içermektedir. Üçüncü bölümde Türkiye ve İsrail arasındaki gelişen ilişkilerin 
bölgedeki yankılarının bir analizi yer almaktadır. Bu bölüm Türk-İsrail 
yakınlaşmasının yirminci yüzyılın sonunda Ortadoğu politikalarını nasıl 
etkilediğini analiz eder ve aynca bazı bölge ülkelerinin yakınlaşmaya verdiği 
tepkiler hakkında bilgi içerir. Çalışmanın bitiş bölümü daha önceki bölümlerde 
yer alan fikirlerin özetini ve ilişkilerin geleceği konusundaki tahminleri içerir.
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INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of the Soviet Union created a unipolar world and this led to 
significant changes in the international structure. This major shift in the balance of 
international power also altered the regional balance of power in the Middle East. In 
addition to this, the Gulf War of 1991 and the Middle East peace process that 
followed the war affected the course of Middle Eastern politics and changed the 
balance of interests within the region.
Foreign policy behavior of any country is influenced by regional and global 
changes.* Therefore, under these structural changes in the 1990s, Turkey and Israel 
sought closer relations in order to increase their own security and capabilities in the 
region and in the international system. The past few years have witnessed major 
developments between the two countries with regard to cooperation on military 
issues, intelligence-sharing, economic affairs, culture, tourism, and, in the wake of 
the disastrous 17 August earthquake, humanitarian assistance. Turkey and Israel have 
repeatedly stressed that their developing ties are not an alliance requiring either 
country to defend the other, the Arab countries are dubious about it. This relationship 
has induced regional states to become more active in regional politics.
‘ Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) 
p.23.
The purpose of this thesis is to present a brief history of Turkish-Israeli 
relations, to display the essence and motives of these relations, and to explain the 
repercussions of the rapprochement between the two countries in the Middle East. 
The sources of the thesis are books, academic journal articles, periodicals, news 
agencies, and web sites that deal with Turkish-Israeli relations and Middle East 
Studies.
This research was motivated by the increasing involvement of Turkey into 
Middle East politics in the post-Cold War era. The writer of this thesis visited 
Jordan, Syria, and Egypt to attend an Arabic course during summer 1997, and 
observed that the increasingly deep relationship between Turkey and Israel disturbed 
some of their neighbors in the region. Moreover, the writer also observed that the 
Arab media’s overemphasis, exaggeration, and in fact disinformation on the military 
relations between Turkey and Israel has created the wrong image and perception of 
the relations between the two countries.^ Therefore, by writing this thesis, the writer 
wants to find what the reasons for increasing ties between Turkey and Israel are, 
what the essence of Turkish-Israeli relations is, and the most important, how this 
relationship affected the Middle East.
The first chapter of this thesis presents information pertaining to Turkish- 
Israeli relations before and after the 1990s. Following an account of the relations 
between Turks and Jews in history, this chapter includes a brief history of the 
Turkish-Israeli relations from the establishment of Israel. It also analyses the
 ^ See Dış Basında Türkiye-Israil Askeri İşbirliği Anlaşmasına Tepkiler (5 Nisan-6 Mayıs 1996), 
Ankara: TC Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Eırformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996.
important changes in the 1990s and gives details about high level visits between the 
two countries.
An analysis of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement requires an account of the 
essence of the relations and a description of the motives behind. The second chapter 
shows that there are several advantages that both Jerusalem and Ankara gain as a 
result of their growing closeness. This chapter focuses on the reasons why Israel and 
Turkey signed military agreements and cooperated in various areas. It also includes 
the essence of the relations and what the components of this relationship are.
The scale and the pace of the development between Turkey and Israel have 
meant that the repercussions of the Turkish-IsraeU relations have not only been felt in 
Jerusalem and Ankara but also in the Middle East and beyond. The third chapter 
presents an analysis of the repercussions of the developing relations between Turkey 
and Israel. It analyses how this rapprochement affected the course of Middle Eastern 
politics at the end of the twentieth century. This chapter also provides information 
about the reactions of some regional states to Turkish-Israeli rapprochement.
Finally, the conclusion part of the study includes an overview of the ideas 
employed within the previous chapters and it also predicts what the future holds for 
this relationship.
CHAPTER I
TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 1990s
The Middle East has been one of the most volatile regions in the world 
especially in the twentieth century. Coups d’etat, wars, rapid shifts in alliances and 
alignments, numerous intra-Arab, intrastate, and region-wide conflicts, and constant 
intervention by outside powers have wrecked the region. In the post-Cold War era, 
there were fundamental changes in the geopolitics of the Middle East: The Gulf War, 
Arab-Israeli peace process, and the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. This 
chapter presents a brief history of Turkish-Israeli relations and gives details about 
high level visits between the two countries in the 1990s.
1.1. Turks and Jews
The relations between Turks and Jews have never been violent in history. For 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire was a principal source of refuge and prosperity for 
Jews fleeing from persecution in Europe. After the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, 
Mehmet the Conqueror invited many Jewish families fi'om Europe to İstanbul.^ The 
Ottoman Empire also welcomed the Jews from Spain fleeing from the oppression of 
the Inquisition in 1492. The Ottoman Jewish community was in close touch with
 ^ For more information about the Turkish-Jewish relations in history See, Halil İnalcık, ‘Turkish- 
Jewish Relations in the Ottoman Empire,” A United Turkish-American (UTA) Publication, Chicago, 
November 1982.
relatives and friends located throughout Europe, and they served as international 
links for the Empire. Jews made important contributions to the Ottoman 
administration, economy, science, culture, and entertainment. Moreover, during the 
World War II, Turkey helped the Jews who fled from Nazi Europe. After the war and 
the creation of Israel, many of Turkey’s Jews also emigrated to Israel. The number of 
Jews who emigrated from Turkey and live in Israel is estimated at 120,000, and most 
of them located in the coastal city of Bat Yam. This community is very active as a 
lobby on Turkey’s behalf because their sense of Turkish identity is very important to 
them.^
1.2. Turkish-Israeli Relations until 1990s
On 14 May 1948, the Jews in Palestine declared the establishment of the 
State of Israel.^ After the Western powers recognized Israel, Turkey also recognized 
this state on 28 March 1949 and established diplomatic relations in the next year.^ 
Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognize Israel officially and Arab states 
criticized Turkey for legitimizing the state of Israel.
Turkish-Israeli relations experienced ups and downs in the next decades with 
the events of the region and of the world. With the exchange of ambassadors in 
1952 ,^ Turkish-Israeli relations showed significant progress but Turkey recalled its
■* Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1991), p.85.
 ^ Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin (eds). The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the 
Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p.l25.
 ^ Ismail Soysal, Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz (1919-1993), (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve 
Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV) Yayınlan, 1993), p.65 and M. Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb R. Khan, 
‘Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Duality and the Development,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly, V ol.l4  No:4 (Fall 1992), p.72.
 ^İsmail Soysal, “Seventy Years of Turkish-Arab Relations and an Analysis o f Turkish-Iraqi Relations 
1920-1990,” An/iMû/1991 Foundation for Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, İstanbul, 1991, p.49
ambassador in November 1956 from Tel Aviv because of the Suez Crisis erupted in 
1956. Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt in October 1956 because of the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Gamal Abdal Nasser of Egypt. Britain 
was a member of the Baghdad Pact that was established with the contributions from 
Britain, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan against the Soviet threat in 1955. Therefore, 
Turkey recalled its ambassador to save Baghdad Pact and Turkey’s credibility in the 
eyes of Arab states. However, Şevket îstinyeli, Turkish Ambassador to Israel, told 
the Israeli officials in the Israeli Foreign Ministry that this diplomatic act should not 
be interpreted as a hostile act to the State of Israel^.
Turkish-Israeli relations may have seemed distant on the surface, but in 
reality, cooperation has been continuous. After the overthrow of the Hashamite 
monarchy in Iraq in July 1958, Turkey and Israel agreed on a secret pact which was 
concluded during an unannounced visit to Ankara of David Ben Gurion, the Israeh 
prime minister in August 1958.'® This was to become known as the ‘peripheral pact’ 
and Israel’s aim was a pact that embraced Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Israel, even 
extending to certain Christian parts of Sudan." However, most of the 1958 
agreements never fully materialized and after the 1960 military coup, Turkey’s
Middle East strategy was built on reducing friction with the Arab states. *12
* Süha Bölükbaşı, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol.29 N o:l, (Autumn 1999), p.23.
’ Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “1965-1973 Yıllan,” in Mehmet Gönlübol and et al. 
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1973 (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayım No:279, 1975) 
İhsan Gürkan, ‘Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process,” Turkish Review of 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.7 (1993), p.l03; Arnikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy 
Relations in the Middle East Mediterrenean (London: Frank Cass, 1987), pp.74-76; and Philip 
Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 
p.77.
'' Nachmani, p.74.
The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine issue have widely affected 
Turkish-Israeli relations. Turkey adopted a balanced approach towards the Arab- 
Israeli conflict from the beginning of the 1960s until the mid-1970s. For example, on 
the one hand, Turkey did not allow using the İncirlik military base by the USA in 
support for Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.^^ On the other hand, 
Turkey also opposed a resolution called for all the participants to break diplomatic 
relations with Israel at the Rabat Conference of the Islamic Conference Organization 
in 1969.*^
The Cyprus issue, the US arms embargo, and the need for diplomatic support 
induced Turkey to improve relations with the Arab countries in the 1970s. The 
energy crisis in the 1970s was another reason for Turkey being drawn towards the 
Arab states. Turkey’s developing economic relations with the Arab world was at the 
expense of Israel. Because of the world oil crisis in the mid-1970s, the importance of 
the Gulf oil in the economic development of Turkey grew* ,^ and this affected 
Turkish-Israeli relations.
Before 1979, Turkey’s support for Palestinian self-determination was only 
verbal. Although Turkey allowed the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) to 
establish a diplomatic mission in Ankara in 1979, the head of the PLO office was 
recognized with the rank of charge d’affairs as the Israeli representative in Ankara
Bülent Aras, Palestinian Israeli Peace Process and Turkey, (New York: Nova Science Publisher, 
1998), p .ll8 .
Ömer Küıkçüoğlu, “The Evolution of Turkish-Arab Relations,” in The Middle East in Turkish- 
American Relations, ed. G.S.Harris (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), p.47 and Aras,
p.118.
Ramazan Gözen, “Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Middle East,” Foreign 
Policy (Ankara), Vol:19 No. 1-2 (1995), p.75.
İhsan Gürkan, ‘Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process,” Turkish Review of 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.7 (1993), p.l09.
had. In August 1980, Turkey protested the Israeli law declaring that Jerusalem is the 
capital of Israel*^ and reduced the level of diplomatic representation in Israel to the 
second secretary level.
After the military intervention in September 1980, Turkish-Arab relations 
flourished but the relations with Israel were never cut completely. Although Turkey 
increased bilateral trade with the regional countries, Ankara abstained ffoni voting on 
a UN resolution condemning Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights in February
1982. 17
The commercial relations between Turkey and Israel started to show good 
signals in the mid 1980s.*  ^ Ankara appointed a senior diplomat to Tel-Aviv in 
September 1986 and indicated the intention to upgrade its relations with Israel. As 
the Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said, contacts with Israel were necessary “as a 
window on future events.” He claimed that for Turkey “to play a role in solving the 
problems of the Middle East, that window must be kept open”.^ ° Israel responded to 
this upgrading of relations by sending a high level diplomat to Ankara.
In 1988, Turkey voted against a resolution which called for the rejection of 
Israeli diplomatic credentials at the UN. On the other hand, in the same year, Turkey 
recognized the Palestine state although Israel expressed disappointment. However,
Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 
1990s,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.25 (February 1993),
Gözen, p.78.
Aras, p.l25,
Gürkan, p .ll4 .
Aykan, p.l03.
The PNC (Palestine National Council), the PLO’s parliament in exile, proclaimed the establishment 
of the Independent Palestine State in Algiers on 15 November 1988. Turkey recognized this new state
Turkish-Israeli relations have steadily improved and the trade between the two states 
jumped from $29 million in 1986 to $140 million in 1990.^^
1.3. Important Changes in the 1990s
From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, there have been important changes 
in the international structure. The end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the Arab- 
Israeli peace process were important developments of the early 1990s that shaped the 
future pace of the relations between Ankara and Jerusalem.
1.3.1. The Collapse of the Soviet Union
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have 
brought drastic changes in the international system. The bipolar characteristic of the 
world has disappeared and this created a new environment in the Middle East 
especially for Turkey and Israel. The end of bipolarity has meant a change in the 
nature of both countries’ relationship with the United States. Therefore, both needed 
to follow different foreign policies to protect their interests. Both Turkey and Israel 
obtained more room for maneuver in the region with the changing geopolitical 
circumstances surrounding them.
The collapse of the Soviet Union opened up new horizons for Turkey. The 
potential significance of the changes brought about by the end of Cold War was 
summarized by Mustafa Ak§in, then Turkey’s ambassador to the United Nations, in 
an address at the University of Columbia in the Fall of 1992: “With the collapse of
within six hours. See Süha Bölükbaşı, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.29 N o:l, (Autumn 1999), p.28.
Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb R. Khan, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 
Duality and the Development,” Arafc Studies Quarterly, V ol.l4  No:4, (Fall 1992), p.80.
communism we now have the luxury of adding an Eastern European, Balkan, Black 
Sea, Caucasus, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern dimension to our traditional 
Western Europe oriented diplomacy.” Turkey’s strategic role had changed “from 
being a dike holding back Soviet expansion,” he said, to becoming “a bridge to a 
new, emerging world and the crossroads where three continents and two seas
_  _ 9923meet.
1.3.2. The Gulf War
The second important change that occurred in the early 1990s was the Gulf 
War whose impact was profound in the Middle East. Turkey abandoned the 
neutrality towards the Middle East region. As Bülent Aras pointed out:
Turkey, Israel and the US sided together against an Arab country; this 
was more than a simple diplomatic coalition or a joint maneuvering 
plan. This situation paved the way for the improvement of relations 
between Turkey and Israel. The increasing strain on Turkish-Arab 
relations, for several reasons, contributed to this situation. The main 
problems with some of the Arab countries were Syrian support of 
Kurdish separatist activities in southeastern Anatolia, the disputed 
waters of the Euphrates, Turkey’s increasing relations with Israel and the 
West, and the lack of support from the Arab world during the migration 
of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria. All these worsened Arab’s image 
in Turkish public and made a positive contribution to Turkish-Israeli 
relations.^"*
As a result of the end of the Cold War, the role of Israel in the Middle East 
against the Soviet Union changed. The Gulf War, as well as the Iran-Iraq War before 
it, also changed Israel’s position in the regional conflicts; therefore, as Dan Tschirgi
George E. Gruen, ‘Turkey and the Middle East after Oslo I,” in The Middle East and the Peace 
Process edited by Robert O. Freedman, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998) p. 181
24 Aras, p.l28.
10
points out that the US pursued a slightly less favorable policy toward Israel without 
jeopardizing either its own interests or Israel’s security.^^
The Gulf War confirmed Washington’s political and military dominance in 
the region and highlighted the crucial role that the United States will have in 
determining the region’s political future. The Gulf War also increased Arab 
countries’ dependence on the United States but the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to 
potentially threaten a solid US sphere of influence.
1.3.3. The Middle East Peace Process
The third important change in the 1990s as far as the Middle East was 
concerned is the beginning of a peace process between Israel and the Arab states. 
The Arab-Israeli peace process opened up a new foreign policy opportunity for 
Turkey. After signing a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles by the two 
parties in September 1993, Turkey was released from the onerous difficulty of 
balancing between Israel and the Arab world. As Ali Karaosmanoglu argued that 
“the success of Arab-Israeli talks would certainly eliminate some of the stumbling 
blocs and it could pave the way for improved Turkish-Israeli relations.’’^  ^From 1993 
onwards, Ankara have tried to deepen its relations with Tel Aviv.
Dan Kschirgi, ed. The Arab World Today (Boulder : Lynne Rienner, 1994).
Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “A Turkish View of Bilateral Relations with Israel,” Actual Situation and 
Prospects of Turkey's Bilateral Relations with Israel : Potential and Opportunities, (TES-AR 
Yayınlan: Ankara, 1992) p.5.
11
1.4. Relations between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s
In 1990s, Turkey got involved in Middle East affairs more actively and 
Turkish-Israeli relations have constantly developed. In December 1991, Turkey 
abstained from a UN General Assembly vote that repealed the resolution equating 
Zionism with racism. Three days after the UN vote, Ankara upgraded its diplomatic 
missions to Israel and the PLO to the ambassadorial level. Turkey also raised the 
level of its representation in Tel Aviv to ambassador^’. In June 1992, Turkish 
Minister of Tourism Abdiilkadir Ateş went to Israel and concluded a tourism 
cooperation agreement.^® This was the first official visit to Israel by a Turkish 
cabinet member in more than twenty years.
Turkish-Israeli relations reached a new height when the Israeli President 
Chaim Herzog came to Istanbul in mid-July 1992.^  ^ At a joint press conference. 
Prime Minister Demirel noted that Turkish-Israeli relations were gradually 
improving and declared that further development of bilateral relations would be in 
the interests of the region and of the world. He added that participation of all regional 
countries in the Middle East peace conference might lead to better results .For his 
part, Herzog underscored that Turkey was an important country in the region and 
stressed that it could play a role in the Middle East peace conference.
In 1992, Turkish General Staff stated that “in the light of the realities of the 
Middle East, Turkey, which is an Islamic and secular country, is careful to balance
İhsan Gürkan, ‘Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process,” Turkish Review of 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.7 (1993), p. 114.
The text of the tourism agreement was published in Resmi Gazete (.the Official Gazette) on 11 
September 1992.
Cumhuriyet, 18 July 1992.
Milliyet, 18 July 1992 and Hürriyet 18 July 1992.
12
its relations with Israel and the Arab world.” '^ However, there is no question that the 
Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles opened the way for a marked shift in 
Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. A month later, in November 1993, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin visited Israel. This was the first official visit by a 
Turkish foreign minister since Israel’s creation in 1948.
1.4.1. Çetin’s visit
Çetin had twice postponed his visit, which was originally scheduled for June. 
The first delay was attributed to Turkish domestic politics and the second was 
because of Israeli attack into southern Lebanon. Sensitive to Arab reaction and 
domestic public opinion. Çetin decided at the last minute to cancel his visit to Israel 
although he arrived in neighboring Jordan. The two postponements of Çetin’s visit 
illustrate the extent to which Turkish-Israeli relations can be affected by domestic 
developments in Turkey and by the Arab-Israel conflict.
According to Foreign Minister Çetin, a new order was emerging in the 
Middle East. Although it was not possible to predict accurately what form it would 
take, he said, “we are resolved to collaborate in the creation of a new Middle Eastern 
order.” During Çetin’s visit to Israel, an agreement outlining the framework of 
bilateral relations and a cultural agreement were signed, and work was begun on 
various economic cooperation agreements, including one dealing with the 
elimination of double taxation, another on encouragement and protection of 
investments, as well as an agreement in principle on e free trade agreement. These
Middle East International, 23 October 1992, p.3 
Newspot, 18 November 1993
13
were finally signed during President Demirel’s visit in March 1996. The Turkish- 
Israeli Business Council was also established in 1993.
1.4.2. Israelis* visits
Turkish-Israeli Relations were described as inevitable and natural by 
diplomats of both countries and developed rapidly. In January 1994, after Israeli 
Defense Ministry director-general David Ivry’s visit, the Israeli President Ezer 
Weizman came to Ankara and met with the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel 
where they agreed on extending dialogue and ties. Weizman said that Israel needed 
to develop better relations with Syria and asked Turkey to play the role of an 
intermediary.
At a joint press conference in Ankara with visiting Foreign Minister Shimon 
Peres on April 11, 1994, Hikmet Çetin announced that ‘Turkey has agreed with 
Israel to shoulder the leadership”^^  in setting up the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME). Turkey and Israel hope to draw in Jordan, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and other moderate Arab states which see the terrorism of 
radical groups as a major threat to regional stability. The idea of a CSCME has long 
been championed by Erdal İnönü. In 1994, İnönü, as chairman of the Grand National 
Assembly’s foreign relations committee, led a multiparty Turkish parliamentary 
delegation to Israel. At the invitation of the Knesset, they discussed on regional 
cooperation with his Israeli counterparts. '^*
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1972,15 April 1994.
George E. Gruen, ‘Turkey’s Growing Regional Role,” Near East Report, 27 June 1994, pp.115- 
116.
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Turkish-Israeli economic cooperation was also expanding. In early June 
1994, Shimon Shetret (the Israeli Minister of Economic and Planning) led a seventy- 
person delegation of Israeli business representatives to explore investment 
opportunities in Turkey’s defense, transport, irrigation, and security sectors.^^
1.4.3. Tansu Çiller^s visit
Prime minister Tansu Çiller’s official visit to Tel-Aviv in November 1994 
represented a further advance in the relations. She characterized the Turkish-Israeli 
cooperation as a “strategic relationship’’.^  ^ During this visit a series of agreements 
were signed including fighting against drug smuggling, terrorism and other criminal 
acts; cooperation in the telecommunications and postal services. An agreement that 
would allow the Israeli Aviation Industries to modernize Turkish Phantom jets was 
important because this was the beginning of a series of military deals. Çiller also 
talked about a list of possible Turkish-Israeli bilateral projects, including improved 
fiber optic communications; allocation of a Turkish communications satellite channel 
to Israel; Mersin and İskenderun port development to streamline handling of 
perishable fhiits and vegetables; formation of multinational air and maritime 
companies; cooperation on power station construction; cooperation in expanding 
tourist facilities in Turkey; connection of Israel to the international electricity grid; 
establishment of joint construction companies; and investment by Israel in 
agricultural, industrial, and conununity development projects in Turkey’s
President and Prime Ministers, Vol.3 Iss.5, September/October 1994, p.20.
Süha Bölükbaşı, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” Journal o f Palestine 
Studies, Vol.29 No:l, (Autumn 1999), p.31.
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Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).^^ Çiller also gave special emphasis to 
cooperation with Israel on various water-related projects.
On 27 June 1995, Israeli Minister of Agriculture Ya’acov Tsur and Turkish 
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Refaettin Şahin signed a cooperation 
agreement in the agricultural field. According to a Financial Times special report on 
Turkey in June 1996, Israeli technical assistance was beginning to have a positive 
impact on farming in the newly irrigated Harran plains of the GAP region. “Pilot 
projects by Israeli experts produce nearly twice as much cotton per hectare with the 
half the water that local farmers use” *^ In Turkey, because of farmers’ inadequate 
irrigation methods, there is a shortage in water in some parts of the country. 
Therefore, Turkish-Israeh technical cooperation in the agricultural field may improve 
agricultural productivity.
1.4.4. Military Agreements
In February 1996, the Turkish Military’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Çevik Bir, 
visited Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Israel. On February 23, 1996 Çevik 
Bir and General David Ivry (the adviser to the Israeli Defense Minister) signed a 
Military Education and Cooperation Agreement that foresaw the exchange of 
aircraft, exchange of military personnel, and granted the right to visit and to use ports 
and air bases in each other’s countries. The Accord also addressed intelligence 
sharing and counter-terrorism. This agreement itself would remain secret; however, it
İç Basında Başbakan Prof. Dr. Tansu Çiller ’in İsrail ve Mısır Ziyareti (Tansu Çiller 's visit to Israel 
and Egypt in the Turkish Press), Ankara: TC Başbakanlık Basm-Yaym ve Enformasyon Genel 
Müdürlüğü, 1994 dad Dış Basında Başbakan Prof. Dr. Tansu Çiller'in İsrail, Filistin özerk Yönetimi 
ve Mısır Arap Cumhuriyeti Ziyaretleri (Tansu Çiller’s visit to Israel, Palestinian National Authority 
and Egypt Arab Republic in the Foreign Press), Ankara: TC Başbakanlık Basm-Yaym ve 
Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 1994.
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was revealed after leaks to the Israeli and Turkish press announced its existence and
certain of its clauses.39
On August 28, 1996 General Ivry and Turkish Undersecretary of Defense 
Tuncer Kilin? signed a second defense agreement (Military Education Agreement), 
which dealt with primarily with the exchange of technical expertise and knowledge. 
This accord was largely expected to pave the way for implementing the deal to 
upgrade Turkey’s F-4 Phantom jets“^®, although the details of the deal were 
considered secret."^ * This pact included a five-year deal to upgrade fighter-bombers, 
to install avionic and navigation systems, radar and electronic warfare.'*  ^ In 
December 1996, Turkey and Israel also agreed on joint air and naval operations, 
concluding the pacts that opened each other’s airspace to military operations.
In the wake of Arab and Iranian criticism of the agreement, the Turkish 
government emphasized that the agreement was not aimed any third party and said 
that Israeli planes would not be allowed to carry arms or intelligence-gathering 
equipment in Turkey. Israeli media reports claim that the agreement also includes
“The Southern Anatolia Project: Irrigation transforms area’s prospects,” Financial Times Survey 
(Turkey), 3 June 1996, p.4.
Dibner, Gil. “My Enemy’s Enemy: Turkey, Israel, and the Middle Eastern Balance of Power,” 
Harvard International Review 21:1 (Winter 98/99).
Efraim Inbar claims that “the two sides initialled an agreement on the upgrading of the Turkish F-4s 
in 1987. Yet, the Palestinian uprising (Intifada), which started in December 1987, created for Turkey a 
very problematic diplomatic atmosphere for engaging in a high profile military link with Israel. 
Subsequently, the Riantom deal was shelved for several years to await more auspicious international 
circumstances for realisation in the 1990s.” See Eftaim Inbar, “The Turkish-Israeli Entente: The New 
Power Alignment in the Middle East,” Adelphi Papers, forthcoming.
“  Arieh O’Sullivan, ‘Turkey, Israel Sign Delayed Defense Industry Pact,” The Jerusalem Post, 29 
August 1997.
Meltem Miiftiller-Ba?, ‘Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership,” Paper presented at the Bi- 
National Conference on Cooperation and Conflict in the Middle East with Special Reference to Water, 
20-21 April 1998, Bilkent University, Turkey.
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provisions for intelligence cooperation aimed at Iran and for Israeli help for Turkish
anti-terrorists-infiltration efforts.43
A major turning point in the relations came during Turkish President 
Süleyman Demirel’s official visit to Israel between 11-14 March 1996. Four 
agreements on economic cooperation, the promotion and protection of bilateral 
investments, free trade, and preventing double taxation were signed. Turkey was 
eager to benefit from Israel’s free trade agreements with the European Union and 
with the United States.
Near the end of May, Turkish Naval Commander, Admiral Güven Erkaya, 
arrived in Israel as a guest of the Israeli Naval Chief, Alex Tal, for a four-day visit. 
The formation of a Turkish government in late June 1996 led by Necmettin Erbakan, 
leader of the Welfare (Refah) Party, did not alter in any way the growing cooperation 
between Turkey and Israel. Although Erbakan often described Israel as a cancer in 
the heart of the Arab and Muslim world, the high level visits continued. At the 
beginning of June, the IDF’s (Israeli Defense Forces) Deputy Chief of Staff, Matan 
Vilnai, flew to Turkey.“^  Erbakan met Israeh Foreign Minister David Levy in Ankara 
on April 8, 1997. *
Alan Makovsky, ‘Turkish-Israeli Cooperation, the Peace Process, and the Region,” Policywatch, 
No: 195, 26 April 1996.
** Gil Sedan, “News Analysis: Tension Thaw as Israel, Turkey Build New Relations,” Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, 18 April 1997.
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1.4.5. The Turkish Chief of Staff’s visit
The Turkish Chief of Staff Ismail Hakkı Karadayi visited Israel in February 
1997 and met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Chief of Staff 
Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and the Prime Minister’s military secretary General Ze’ev 
Livne. In the meeting Netanyahu said that “we appreciate Turkey and its military, 
and I believe that cooperation between us is a very important item in assuring the 
aspiration for peace and stability in the Middle East, an area which contains many 
extremist elements.” Karadayi, on the other hand, thanked the Israeli Prime Minister 
and added that he “certainly appreciates the importance of dialogue between Israel 
and T u r k e y . B y  this meeting, Ismail Hakkı Karadayi became the first Chief of the 
General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces to visit Israel.
1.4.6. Turhan Tayan’s Visit
In May 1997, Turkish Defense Minister Turhan Tayan visited Israel, and 
toured the Lebanese-Syrian borders, and the Golan Heights. During the conversation 
with his Turkish colleague, Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Mordechai raised the 
idea of tri-partite defense training between Israeli, Turkish, and American forces. 
Tayan noted, ‘Turkish-Israeli cooperation is not directed against any third party. 
Turkey ascribes great importance to these relations, and I believe that cooperation 
between us will contribute to regional stability and advance the peace process.”'*^ 
Both ministers also expressed concern over the arms race in the Middle East and the 
efforts to develop surface-to-surface missiles and non-conventional weapons.
“Summary o f Meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Turkish Chief o f Staff Ismail Hakkı 
Karadayi,” The Web Site o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f Israel, 27 February 1997, 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il> (18 January 1998).
“Summary o f Meeting between Minister of Defence Yitzhak Mordechai and Turkish Defence 
Minister Turhan Tayan,” The Web Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 30 April 1997, 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il> (25 February 1998).
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1.4.7. Mordechai’s visit and the OIC Summit
In December 1997, while Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai was 
visiting Turkey, Iran hosted an Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
summit. In the conference, a resolution passed for reconsideration of military 
cooperation with Israel.“*’ Although Turkey was not named in the resolution, it is the 
only Muslim state that cooperates with Israel militarily. As a result, Turkish 
president left the summit earlier than expected.
Mordechai’s visit to Turkey was the first by an Israeli Defense Minister. 
Before meeting Mordechai, Turkish Defense Minister İsmet Sezgin said “this 
resolution does not bind us, we will continue our cooperation with Israel because we 
believe regional peace can only be achieved through such activities.”“** In addition, 
Turkish Chief of General Staff General Ismail Hakkı Karadayi told Mordechai 
‘There will always be nations against our cooperation, but we are interested in 
deepening and strengthening it. ” He added, “We are surrounded by regimes with 
various problems. Israel and Turkey are two islands of stability which must be 
preserved together.Karadayi also pointed out that Turkey is fully satisfied with 
the military and defense industry cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Mordechai, 
on the other hand, summed up the Israeli aim of the relationship with Turkey by 
saying “when we lock hands we will form a powerful fist. These relations will help 
us defend ourselves against any threat and help establish peace in the region.” “^
 ^ Michele L. Kjorlien, “Relations with Israel (Relationship of Israel with other Countries),” Journal 
of Palestine Studies Vol.27 No.3 (Spring 1998), p.l30.
“Israel Defence Minister in Turkey,” UPf 8 December 1997
Arieh O’Sullivan, “Israel and Turkey Meet to Bolster Defense Ties,” Jerusalem Post, 12 December 
1997.
Haaretz, 9 December 1997.
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1.4.8. Reliant Mermaid
Turkey and Israel held for the first time a joint naval exercise, named 
“Reliant Mermaid” on January 7, 1998. Jordan sent an observer and the United States 
also participated in the search and rescue operation. This exercise drew a storm of 
protest from the Arab states^* and Iran, seeming to confirm fears that the Turkish- 
Israeli relations had reached strategic proportions. The exercise involved an 
American destroyer from the Sixth Fleet, two Turkish frigates, two Israeli Saar 
missile boats, a number of Israeli helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, and 
approximately 1000 sailors.^^
These exercises were originally scheduled to take place in the summer of 
1997, but were postponed until November of that year, and then were postponed 
again until January 1998. Reliant Mermaid was said to be an innocent search-and- 
rescue mission; however, it was described by the Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak 
Mordechai, as having a ‘security aspect’. E g y p t  ignored an invitation to send an 
official observer. Commenting on the maneuvers, Amr Musa, Egypt’s Foreign 
Minister said, ‘The timing was unfortunate in view of the freezing of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process because of the Israeli government’s inflexibility, and the instability
For example, the Beirut based Al-Nahar daily wrote that the US-Israel-Turkey joint military 
maneuver in the Mediterranean Sea is an official announcement of the formation of Ankara-Tel Aviv 
coalition under direct supervision of the United States. Another daily Al-Safir said that holding of 
such maneuvers is a preparatory measure that paves the way for the establishment of a multilateral 
coalition in the Middle East. The daily also warned that such coalition not only threatens the Middle 
East but also endanger the Central Asian countries. Al-Nahar and Al-Safir, 3 January 1998.
Middle East Security Report, No:50, 8 January 1998 and “US, Israel, and Turkey To Participate in 
Exercise Reliant Mermaid,” DefenseLlNK News, No.230, 22 December 1997.
Nadia E. El-Shazly, “Arab Anger at New Axis,” The World Today, Vol.55, N o.l, January 1999,
p.26.
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this is causing in the area.” '^* Libya accused Turkey of betraying its identity and 
historic ties to Mushms and Arabs, “defying the beliefs of its people and licking the 
boots of the Americans and Israelis.”^^
1.4.9, Mesut Yılmaz’s visit
With the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s official visit to Israel, 
which closely followed the trip by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in July 1998, 
Turkey’s relations with Israel went one step further. Although both leaders tried to 
emphasize the economic nature of the relations, Syria, which sees itself as the main 
target of this cooperation, reacted angrily against the developing relations between 
Turkey and Israel. The official al-Ba’th newspaper described Yilmaz’s tour as “a 
hostile move’’ and urged Arab and Muslim countries to “confront it and firmly 
contain its results.’’^  ^ Yilmaz countered with accusations against Damascus. 
“Frankly, I do not care how Syria comments on my visit,’’ he said. “Anyone who 
speaks of hostility in the region should focus on the policies of the Syrian 
government which encourage separatist terrorism on Turkey.’’^ ’ The support 
extended by Syria to the PKK terrorists was a source of major strain between Ankara 
and Damascus.
After Yilmaz’s visit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel again claimed 
that “Israeli-Turkish cooperation is not designed to harm any state; on the contrary, it
“Iranian Security Considerations in the Wake of Joint Manouveres of Turkey, US and Israel,” 
Tehran Times, 13 January 1998.
“Iran, Arabs, Greece, Russia, Libya Lambast Turkish-Israeli Maneuver,” Tehran Times, 8 January 
1998.
^  Nicole Pope, “Yilmaz Welcomed in Israel,” Middle East International, 18 September 1998, p.9. 
Ibid, p.9.
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is intended to help states in the region.” *^ The model that they would like to present 
as an example is the Council of Security and Cooperation, which was established 
between Western and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. The Council was not aimed 
against any party, and was rather designed to help all sides. Yoav Biran, from the 
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “we are referring to the building of 
cooperation that will hopefully include Egypt, Jordan, and other states in the region- 
not against any party, but rather for the good of all.”^^
The capture of two Israelis on suspicion of spying on a military installation in 
Cyprus in November 1998 has aggravated regional tensions about the ties between 
Israel and Turkey .A rab  governments have become increasingly wary of the 
Turkish-Israeli military and intelligence links. In October 1998, the Turkish Sabah 
newspaper reported that Turkey and Israel signed a military accord to build a new 
type of ground-to-air missiles for $80 million.^* In December 1999, Turkey, Israel, 
and the US carried out a second search and rescue maneuvers in Aksaz, called 
Reliant Mermaid 99, with Jordan as an observer.
1.4.10. DemireVs visit
At July 1999 visit of President Demirel to Israel, water was a major 
discussion topic. Turkey has showed a marked interest in selling water to I s rae l .A  
joint committee was set up to discuss the feasibility of Turkey’s offer to sell 180
“Excerpts from Interview with Yoav Biran, Senior Deputy Director General, Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs,” The Web Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f Israel, 10 September 1998, 
<httD://www.mfa.gov.il> (19 January 1999).
Ibid.59
^  Israel denied the two arrested men were involved in any secret mission involving Cyprus’ 
relationship with Turkey. See Uzi Mahnaimi, “Mossad Mocked in Cyprus Spy Farce,” The Sunday 
Times, 15 November 1998.
Sabah, 24 October 1998.
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million cubic meters of water per year to Israel. During an informal talk in 
Jerusalem, Demirel told the journalists:
We should look at Israel closely. This is an interesting laboratory for 
transforming the desert into a civilized country with legendary results: a 
per capita income of $16000, a foreign trade volume of $72 billion and a 
gross national product of over $100 billion. There are many lessons 
Turkey could learn from this. Closer cooperation and more frequent 
contacts are needed in all areas.^^
The extraordinary flurry of high-level visits between Turkey and Israel has 
resulted in numerous agreements on cooperation in the domains of culture, science 
and education; health and agriculture; encouragement and protection of financial 
investments; the prevention of drug smuggling; the environment and nature 
protection; avoidance of dual taxation; mail and telecommunications; regulation of 
custom duties; economic and technical affairs. The essence of these agreements and 
both Turkish and Israeli motives to improve the relations will be explained in the 
next chapter.
“Manavgat Çayı’ndan İsrail’e Su Saüşı Konusunda Açıklama,” Dışişleri Güncesi, 7 September 
1999, p.22.
Sami Kohen, “Ortadoğu’da Daha Aktif Bir Politika (A More Active Policy in the Middle East),” 
Milliyet, 18 July 1999.
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CHAPTER II
THE ESSENCE AND THE MOTIVES OF THE RELATIONS
An analysis of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement requires presenting the 
essence of the relations and a description of the motives behind. This chapter focuses 
on the reasons why Israel and Turkey signed military agreements and cooperated in 
various areas. It also presents the essence of the relations and what the components 
of this relationship are.
2.1. The Essence of the Relations
Although some analysts claim that Turkish-Israeli relations are based on 
military affairs solely, there are actually other supporting aspects of the relations, 
including cultural, financial, environmental, tourism, crime-fighting, and economic 
affairs. Because of these non-military aspects of the relations in addition to military 
dimensions, the relations between Israel and Turkey have a strategic quality.
2.1.1. Military
Turkish-Israeli military relationship touches upon many domains: air, sea, 
land, intelligence, and the manufacturing of aircraft, armaments, and missiles. The 
February agreement started an era of military cooperation between Israel and Turkey. 
The parties agreed to allow for members of each state’s air force to fly training 
exercises within the other country’s borders. Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that
25
“the Israeli and Turkish armed forces use the same type of aircraft, with the same 
specifications, makes technological cooperation both necessary and useful.”^
This first military agreement became the forerunner of a number of military 
agreements, ranging from naval training exercises to joint missile production. The 
military training program was inaugurated on April 16, 1996, when eight Israeli F-16 
fighter-bombers and their crews arrived at an air base outside Ankara (Akıncı) for a 
week of training. This exercise was of great benefit to Israel, since Turkey’s much 
larger area and mountainous terrain provide for more opportunity than is available in 
a small country such as Israel. Turkish F-16 pilots went to Israel for training later in 
that year and had the opportunity to benefit from Israel’s systems of training in 
advanced technological warfare.
Although the International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that the 
flights of Israeli aircrafts in Turkey almost certainly included reconnaissance 
missions aimed at Syria and Iraq,^  ^ Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that the 
aircrafts, whether in Turkish or Israeli territory, have not been using either 
ammunition or electronic listening devices.
Israel’s aviation industries are benefiting from Turkey’s attempt to reduce its 
dependence on arms bought from America. Israel won a $75-million contract for 
upgrading forty-eight F-5 jets. Israel also offered to sell Turkey Israeli Phalcon early
^  “Statement from Turkish Foreign Ministry,” The Web Site o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, 10 April 1996, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> (9 September 1999).
Michael Eisenstadt, ‘Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation: An Assessment,” Policywatch, No:262, 
24 July 1997.
“  Stephen Kinzer, “The Mideast’s New Friendship,” The New York Times, 14 April 1997.
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warning aircraft, and to modernize Turkey’s three hundred US-made M-60 tanks.^ ® 
F-4 modernization started in February 1997. In accordance with the agreement with 
Israel, a total of 54 F-4 planes will be modernized and Israel will hand over a 
modernized plane in every month.^^ The modernization of 26 of those planes will be 
made at the Israel Aircraft Industry's facilities in Tel Aviv, and 28 of those planes 
will be upgraded at the Turkish Air Force facilities in Eskişehir. The modernization 
of the F-4s will be concluded in 2003.’°
Another aspect of air force cooperation lies in the establishment of a radar 
network to be used to pinpoint and identify migration routes of predatory birds in fall 
and spring. Naval exercises were also stipulated, as well as allowing the Israeli navy 
to train at Turkish diving facilities for lesser costs.
Cooperation in Defence Industries
At the beginning of October 1997, evidence of a further deepening of military 
relations was provided with Amnon Shahak’s visit, the Israeli Chief of Staff. As a 
result of the talks on cooperation in the defense industries, it was agreed that both 
countries would consider joint manufacture of the jet-propelled, 400-km.-range 
Delilah cruise m iss i le . In  addition to the fact that Turkey had already purchased 
fifty Popeye I missiles, in May 1997, Israel and Turkey announced that they agreed 
to jointly produce the Popeye II air-to-ground missile in a $100 million deal.”
’^“Statement from Turkish Foreign Ministry,” The Web Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, 10 April 1996, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> (9 September 1999).
Turkish Probe, 14 March 1997.
“Modernization of F-4 Planes,” Anatolian News Agency, 27 January 2000.
™ “Turkey Takes Delivery of Two Warplanes Modernized in Israel,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 
January 2000.
27
On the other hand, in February 1998, the commander of the Turkish Air 
Force visited Israel to finalize an agreement to manufacture the IsraeU “Arrow” 
missile in TurkeyJ^ However, the agreement was not signed. Turkey and Israel could 
hold only unofficial meetings about the issue as the USA was opposed to it although 
Turkey has showed great interest in Arrow system for three years. Turkey and Israel 
have started to hold official contacts on the issue when the US shed green light for 
the installation of the system in Turkey. The two states held their first official 
meeting on the US-Israeh joint production Arrow missile system in Tel Aviv on 31 
March 2000.’'* A delegation from the Turkish General Staff went to Tel Aviv and 
met with Israeli officials. The meeting was defined as a first step taken for the 
purchase of Arrow system by Turkey. The Turkish delegation also made 
observations about the latest trials of Arrow II system in Israel .Arrow missiles 
destroy long-range nuclear or conventional missiles in the air.
Intelligence Sharing
Israel and Turkey have shared intelligence on various matters for a number of 
years and this cooperation has reportedly been expanded. Intelligence cooperation 
comprises the exchange of information, routine briefings, and analysis of data. The 
two governments watch for the developments of weapons of mass destruction, for 
terrorism, for threats to energy sources, and for developments in the Central Asia.’^
Turkish Daily News, 14 October 1997.
Arieh O’Sullivan, “Israel, Turkey to Make Popeye Missiles,” The Jerusalem Post, 18 May 1997. 
“Israel, Turkey Hold Talks on Arrow Missile Defense System Purchase,” BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 31 March 2000.
“Arrow Missile Defense System Talks between Turkey and Israel,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 
April 2000.
‘Turkish-Israeli Talks on Arrow Missile Defense System Purchase,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
31 March 2000.
28
Along with intelligence sharing, Israel had also advised Turkey on 
antiterrorism methods. However, Israeli governments have avoided taking a direct 
and active role in Turkey’s war with the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), Abdullah 
Ocalan’s separatist Kurdish movement. “Israel does not want to open a new front 
with terrorism, because we have enough problems already,”’’ said Yossi Melman, an 
Israeli journalist who has written a book on Israel’s intelligence agencies. In 1999, 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also drew a distinction between 
antiterrorism assistance to Turkey and Turkey’s capture of Abdullah Ocalan. 
“Israel’s activity does not include any role in the struggle against Ocalan, and we did 
not cooperate with any element in apprehending Ocalan,” Netanyahu told a news 
conference. “We always fight terrorism, and we will always fight terrorism, but we 
certainly had no part in the capture of Ocalan.”’* Although Netanyahu denied any 
Israeli role, PKK apparently chose Israel as its target in response to rumors that 
Mossad, the Israeli secret service, had played a role in Turkey’s capture of their 
leader. PKK started Europe wide protests and 3 PKK militants shot dead by Israeli 
guards when some PKK militants tried to enter the Israeli consulate in Berlin.
2.1.2. Civilian Cooperation
Turkish-Israeli alignment is not merely limited to security and military 
concerns. Alongside close-military ties, there is extensive cooperation in the civilian 
domain that creates the basis for further expansion in the relationship between Israel 
and Turkey. These include interaction in the domains of culture, education and
Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol.5, No.2, 
June 1998.
Joel Greenberg, “Israel Denies Role but Fears Reprisal for Ties to Turkey,” The New York Times, 
18 February 1999.
Roger Cohen, “3 Kurds Shot Dead by Israeli Guards at Berlin Protest,” The New York Times, 18
February 1999.
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science; avoidance of dual taxation; regulation of trade free of customs duties; 
technical and economic cooperation; encouragement and protection of financial 
investments; health and agriculture; mail and telecommunications; efforts to stop the 
smuggling of drugs and narcotic substances; and the environment and nature
protection 80
Economy
An Israeli official pointed out that both countries had market-oriented 
economies that were complementary in nature.** The conclusion of a free trade area 
agreement on 16 March 1996 opened new possibilities for economic relations 
between Turkey and Israel.*  ^ This agreement reflected the continuation of the 
deepening economic ties between the two countries by making existing trade cheaper 
and attracting potential new trade. Turkish-Israeli bilateral trade is today tbe largest 
between any two countries in the Middle East.*^
The economic component of the relations has been important for Turkish 
economy. Turkish exports to Israel have increased thirteen-fold since 1989, from $30 
million that year to $390 million in 1997. Overall trade volume has grown seven-fold 
during this period, from $90 million to $260 million.*'* By 1998, Israel was Turkey’s 
largest market in the Middle East and North Africa.
“Israelis Kill Four in Mob,” Turkish Daily News, 18 February 1999.
Arnikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol.5, No.2, 
June 1998
‘Turkey, Israel to Scrap Barriers,” Financial Times, 12 March 1996.
Neill Lochery, “Israel and Turkey: Deepening Ties and Strategic Implications, 1995-98,” Israel 
Affairs Vol.5 N o.l (Fall 1998), p.48.
Alan Makovsky, ‘The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 
1999), p.l02.
^  Özlenen Sezer and H. Tlilay Güzel, İsrail Ülke Etüdü (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yayım 
No22, 1997) and Alan Makovsky, ‘The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey, 
V ol.l, No.2, April-June 1999, p.l4.
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In February 2000, Turkish-Israeli Joint Economic Commission (JEC) met in 
Tel Aviv and a memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkish State 
Minister Hasan Gemici and Israeli Minister of Trade and Industry Ron Cohen in a 
reception held by Ahmet Üzümcü, Turkish Ambassador to Israel. The memorandum 
aims at increasing the existing trade volume between the two countries, which is 900 
milUon dollars to 2 billion dollars.*^ The two ministers said that they will reach this 
goal soon and the document signed opens a new stage in the relations of the two 
countries.
There were three major issues in the JEC meeting; prospect of Israel's 
purchase of Manavgat water, Israeli participation in Turkey's Southeastern Anatoha 
Project (GAP) and formation of a free-trade zone.^  ^ The main results of the JEC 
meeting, which also was reflected in the memorandum of understanding, are as 
follows:
Manavgat water: Turkey once again reiterated that it is ready to sell water 
from Manavgat brook to meet the water shortage in Israel. Israel said that it would 
give a response to Turkey as soon as possible.
Free trade zones: The two countries declared the establishment of free trade 
zones which will enable Turkey and Israel to export goods to the US without custom 
duties and quotas. Israeli officials promised that they would launch efforts to get the 
support of the US for the zones planned to be set up in Turkey.
‘Turkey Keen on Economic Cooperation with Israel,” Xinhua News Agency, 6 February 2000. 
“State Minister Gemici Due To Israel,” Anadolu News Agency, 5 February 2000.
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GAP projects: It was decided to examine the participation of Israeli firms in 
the irrigation project in Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). However, Turkey did 
not give a commitment to give these projects to Israeli firms. Turkey wants to win 
certain tenders of Israel in return to GAP projects. No result was taken about giving 
the construction project of Ashdod part to Turkish firms. The two countries also
reached a consensus about undertaking investments together in third countries.87
Tourism
In addition to these relations, Israeli tourism to Turkey has grown 
enormously. For example, more than a quarter of a million Israelis have visited 
Turkey during 1997 and became an integral part of Turkey’s tourist trade. Erkan 
Mumcu, Tourism Minister of Turkey, went to Israel on a four-day official visit in 
November 1999 and met with Israeli Tourism Minister Amnon Lipkin Sahak.*  ^
Mumcu said Turkey and Israel were developing a model titled "East Mediterranean" 
and were getting ready to present this to world tourism market. He and his Israeli 
counterpart agreed on a travel route that will start in Athens, pass through Istanbul, 
Ephesus, Antalya, Haifa, and end in Jerusalem. Israel and Turkey will also cooperate
in the restoration of historical sites, Mumcu added.89
In May 2000, Turkish-Israeli Tourism Delegations' Meeting was held in 
Istanbul with the participation of representatives of Turkish and Israeli private 
sectors. The two sides decided to encourage joint investments in the tourism sector *
‘Turkish-Israeli Economic Committee Signs Memorandum on Free Tradezone,” BBC Monitoring 
Service, 17 February 2000.
** ‘Tourism Minister Meets with Israeli Counterpart,” IPR Strategic Business Information Database, 
28 November 1999.
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and a joint declaration was issued at the end of the meeting. The declaration 
emphasized that promotion activities would be accelerated to enable third countries 
to join tourism cooperation between Turkey and Israel.^‘^ After the meeting, 
responding to questions of journalists, Mumcu said that every year 150 thousand to 
500 thousand Israeli tourists come to Turkey to spend their holidays. In his part, 
Israeli Tourism Minister underlined the importance of religious belief tourism to 
mark the 2000‘*’ anniversary of Jesus Christ's birth.®^
Promotions also started in the US to start a tourist exchange programme 
between Turkey and Israel. ‘Tourists who come from overseas countries have special 
interests in religion, sports and culture. They generally stay longer than ten days and 
want to visit cultural and religious sites. These religious centers are mostly gathered 
in Anatolia and Israel. Egypt can also be a part of this programme with its old 
civilization,” Mumcu explained.^^
2.2. Motives
The Middle East can be described as a region filled with antagonism, enmity, 
and armed conflict. In such a region, the driving force behind the growing Turkish- 
Israeli relations can be found in the relations of these two countries with their 
regional neighbors. One of the most important aims of the Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement is to deter other states from taking hostile actions against either Israel 
or Turkey.
‘Turkey and Israel to Cooperate in Tourism,” Anadolu News Agency, 20 December 1999. 
‘Turkish-Israeli Tourism Delegations’ Meeting Ends,” Anadolu News Agency, 19 May 2000. 
‘Turkish-Israeli Tourism Delegations Meeting,” Anadolu News Agency, 18 May 2000. 
“Turkey and Israel to Cooperate in Tourism,” Anadolu News Agency, 20 December 1999.
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2.2.1. Turkey’s Motivations
As one senior Turkish military official stated “we are surrounded on all sides 
by trouble. We are in the hot seat. It is critical for us to jump outside this circle of 
chaos and find friends in the region. Israel was the perfect choice.”^^  Simply, Turkey 
was looking for an ally in the region and as Daniel Pipes asks “what better ally than 
Israel?”’"'
Following the signing of a military cooperation agreement in April 1996, a 
Turkish Foreign Ministry statement said “we believe that Turkish-Israeli cooperation 
will contribute to regional peace, stability, as well as to the furthering on the Middle 
East peace process.”’  ^ Domestic terrorism, territorial conflicts, natural resource 
disputes, clashing interests, and historical enmities: all play a central role in Turkey 
and Israel’s calculations in terms of their regional policies.
According to General Çevik Bir, former deputy chief of the Turkish General
Staff,
Turkey and Israel inhabit a region troubled by security concerns that 
include religious fundamentalism, terrorism, illicit trafficking of arms 
and drugs, transfer of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and mass movements of refugees. These two states 
thus have overlapping security interests as well as political and 
economic interests.’^
For Turkey, Israel was a natural ally, both because of a shared distrust of Arab states 
and to counterbalance a threat from an anti-Turkish strategic alliance such as 
between Greece and Syria.
John Pomfret, ‘Turkey Strengtens Ties to Israel,” The Washington Post, 2 June 1996.
Daniel Pipes, “The Real New Middle East,” Commentary Vol.106 No.5 (November 1998) and “A 
New Axis: TTie Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente,” The National Interest Vol.50 (Winter 1997/98). 
Statement from Turkey’s Foreign Ministry, 10 April 19%.
On 26 October 1999, General Çevik Bir (ret.), former deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, 
addressed The Washington Institute’s Policy Forum on Turkish-Israeli relations and Turkish security
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Israel is a natural partner to Turkey’s strategic concerns—namely, fear of 
expanding radical, extremist Islamic, and Russian influence. Radical Iraq, long-range 
missile proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction are further issues of concern 
in Ankara and Jerusalem. As Effaim Inbar argues, “the dangers of missile and 
nuclear proliferation have generated greater openness to exploration of alternative 
cooperative and regional security arrangements.’’^ ’ Both countries have parallel 
disputes with Syria, a country that encourages terror and has historic territorial 
claims against its neighbors.
From the Turkish perspective, close relations with Israel may provide easier 
access to Israeli technology and know-how. For Turkey, the Israelis have provided 
the military equipment that requires modernizing its army at very competitive prices. 
Cooperation with Israel also brings Turkey a regional ally to cope with regional 
insecurities. According to Hasan Tahsin, an Arab journalist, it allows Turkey to 
acquire a friend, something Turkey is lacking in international politics.^® As an 
another reason for the Turkish rapprochement, Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli 
offer that “the enhanced cooperation in civilian domains [between Turkey and Israel] 
serves the interests of Turkey’s Kemalist elite well in demonstrating Ankara’s 
continued orientation towards the West and its commitment to secularism.’’^ ^
in the region. See “Special Policy Forum Report: Reflections on Turkish-Israeli Relations and Turkish 
Security,” Policy watch, No:422, 5 November 1999.
Efraim Inbar, “Contours of Israel’s New Strategic Thinking,” Political Science Quarterly, Spring 
1996, p.59.
Hasan Tahsin, “The Cost of Turkey’s Israeli Connection,” Saudi Gazette, Jeddah, 24 September 
1998.
’’ Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, “The Turkish-Israeli Alignment,” Security Dialogue, Vol.31, 
N o.l, March 2000.
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Turkey also expects that the Israeli government and lobbies will work on its 
behalf in Washington. Turkey has always been well aware of Israel’s strong support 
in the US. For example, according to the Israeli newspapers. Evren Güvendiren, then 
the head of the Turkish mission to Israel, expressed Turkey’s appreciation of Israeli 
opposition to pro-Armenian bill in the US Senate when he met with Foreign Minister 
Moshe Arens on 22 May 1990.*^
As Şükrü Elekdağ explains that “The Israeli lobby in the US is far superior to 
all other ethnic lobbies put together. Whenever this lobby has worked for us, Turkish 
interests have been perfectly protected against the fools in the US. The development 
of Turkish-Israeli relations and the formalization of their de facto alliance will place 
this lobby permanently on our side.”*®*
2.2.2. Israel’s Motivations
Israel is a tiny country, greatly outnumbered by the surrounding Arab states. 
In an atmosphere of growing suspicion and distrust of the peace process and an 
accumulation of missiles by Israel’s enemies, Israel sought out a military relationship 
with Turkey. As Alvin Rubinstein explains “the perennial shadow cast by proximate 
Arab military forces means that any territorial concessions made by Israel concerning 
Golan and the West Bank would result in far less favorable lines of defense, 
established nearer to its center of population and industry, and in circumstances that 
would complicate defensive dispositions in the event of a simultaneous attack from
The Jerusalem Post, 29 May 1990 
Milliyet, 14 December 1994.
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several directions.” The rapprochement with Turkey is a method to reduce these 
vulnerabilities and to compensate for this lack in strategic depth.
On the other hand, quest for security has been a part of Israel’s political and 
military doctrine since its establishment. Although the US has preserved Israel’s 
security for decades, Tel Aviv also needs regional friends to balance its hostile 
enemies in the region. Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler claim that Israel cannot rely 
on its own efforts to withstand the new challenges emerging in the Middle East.^°  ^
Therefore, it can be said that the developing relations with Turkey is also a natural 
outcome of Israel’s quest for security in the Middle East.
From the Israeli perspective, cooperation with Turkey may accelerate its geo- 
cultural integration in the region. Additionally, it may help Israel to penetrate into the 
markets of the ex-Soviet republics. For Israel, a developing relationship with Turkey 
serves the purpose of gaining a regional ally in the face of continued Arab hostility. 
Indeed, Israel and Turkey share a ‘common sense of otherness’ in a region 
dominated by Arabs and non-democratic regimes.
Israel has also financially benefited from sales to Turkey of arms and weapon 
technology transfers. Over the next twenty-five years, Turkey plans to spend $150 
billion to modernize its military and Israel wants to sell as much as it can. Israel’s 
position as the world’s fifth arms producer fits with Turkish plans for arms
Alvin Rubinstein, ‘Transformation: External Determinant,” in The Arab-IsraeliConflict: 
Perspectives, ed. Alvin Rubinstein, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p.63
Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandlo·, “The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: Toward a Security 
Regime,” BESA Security and Policy Studies No.23, June 1995.
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modernization. This also allows Turkey to obtain weapons and technology that 
Turkey would not be able to get in Europe or the USA, because of its human rights 
record and its dispute with Greece. As Effaim Inbar pointed out that “the United 
States as well as other Western powers are not always reliable weapons suppliers for 
political and various reasons.”*”^  Therefore, Turkey’s search for a guaranteed supply 
and upgrading of modernized and updated technological weaponry can be fulfilled 
through its military relationship with Israel.
Although both Israel and Turkey hope to achieve certain goals by maintaining 
a close relationship, the reasons and motivations behind the Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement can also be found in their relations with their regional neighbors. 
Since both Israel and Turkey have substantial disagreements and disputes with Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran; it can be understood why the two have initiated closer relations.
All of these factors provide for a strong basis for continuation and 
strengthening of the Turkish-Israeli relations. However, increasing ties between 
Turkey and Israel have important implications not just for those two countries but 
also for the Middle East as a whole. Most of the other countries in the region viewed 
Turkish-Israeli rapprochement as a threat to their interests. The repercussions of the 
Turkish-Israeli relations will be explained in detail in the next chapter.
'“^ Alan Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish Periphery Strategy?” in Reluctant 
Neighbour: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri Barkey (Washington DC: The United States 
Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 169
Elfaim Inbar, “The Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership,” Lecture at the Woodrow Wilson Center, 
Washington DC, 16 September 1998.
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CHAPTER III
R E F L E C T I O N S  O N  T U R K I S H - I S R A E L I  R E L A T I O N S
The scale and the pace of the development between Turkey and Israel have 
meant that the reflections of the Turkish-Israeli relations have not only been felt in 
Jerusalem and Ankara but also in the Middle East and beyond. Indeed, this 
rapprochement has affected the course of the Middle Eastern politics at the end of the 
twentieth century to a great degree. It forced many states to change their strategic 
outlooks.
3.1. General Views on Turkish-Israeli Relations
Many Arab countries see the Turkish-Israeh relations as a “renewed Baghdad 
Pact”*®^. Although Turkey and Israel have stated that the rapprochement between the 
two countries is not aimed any third party, many Arab states viewed it as Turkey’s 
second betrayal of the Arabs in fifty years.*®^  The Arab League, meeting on 
September 16, 1998, harshly criticized the Turkish-Israeli ties and claimed that it 
“exposes Arab national interests to real danger and brings the region back to the 
policy of axes and alliances.” In this meeting Arab foreign ministers called on
Ofira Bengio and Gencer Ozcan, “Changing Relations: Turkish-Israeli-Arab Triangle,” Perceptions, 
March-May 2000, p. 138.
According to Arab states, the first one was the recognition of Israel by Turkey in 1949. See, 
Ha’aretz, 3 June 1997.
108 Turkish-Israeli Affair,”77je Economist, 19 September 1998 and Jennifer Washburn, “Power 
Bloc:Turkey and Israel Lock Arms,” The Progressive Magazine, December 1998.
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Turkey to end its military relationship with Israel “due to the danger it entails to the 
security of Arab countries.”^^ ^
The Arab states and Iran hold deep-seated suspicions of Turkey, for several 
reasons: “first, it is the former imperial power in the region; second, it is too closely 
allied with the West; and third, it has abandoned the teachings of Islam for the sake 
of creating a Western secular, modem state.”*'® Furthermore, ‘Turkish foreign policy 
has always been designed so as to give priority to relations with the West rather than 
the Middle East, and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has always 
been considered an extension of the Western-oriented Turkish foreign policy.”" '
Although Arab states dislike the Turkish-Israeli relationship. General Çevik 
Bir, former deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, claimed, ‘Turkish-Israeli 
military cooperation was initiated to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. 
It is not an alliance, however. Because of their leading roles in the region, Turkey 
and Israel have a responsibility to establish a model for relations among regional 
countries.”"^
According to Off a Bengio and Gencer Özcan, about the Turkish-Israeli 
relations, the Arab fear was
‘That the alignment would increase the strategic threat to the Arab countries 
in general and the more vulnerable ones in particular, namely Syria and Iraq,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Egypt: Arab League Issues Resolution,” FBIS-NES-98- 
2 6 0 ,17 September 1998.
Meltem MüftUler-Baç, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), p.38.
Nur Bilge Criss and Pınar Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East,” The Middle 
East Review of International Affairs Journal, issue. 1, January 1997, p.2.
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That it would further fragment the Arab world by bringing to the alignment 
an Arab country, namely Jordan, and
That it would jeopardize the Arab-Israeli peace process or at least weaken the 
Arab partners’ bargaining power by providing Israel with new strategic depth, as it 
were, and thus strengthen its hand, and its intransigence at the negotiating table.”
114‘Turkey’s efforts to allay Arab and Muslim fears have not worked 
Having received strong and uniform criticism from the Arab states for the Turkish 
intention, Turkey announced that this rapprochement is not against any country in the 
region.'*^ However, this statement did not persuade Arab countries who say that 
“such a statement does not reflect the fact that all military alliances are bom because 
of a perceived need and threat from an enemy or a potential enemy. Therefore 
Turkish assertions about the alliance with Israel, a country hostile to the Arab states, 
are not very credible.”**^
3.2. Arab Media
Arab media’s overemphasis, exaggeration, and in fact disinformation on the 
military relations between Turkey and Israel has created the wrong image and 
perception of the relations between the two countries. Radical Arabs labeled the 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation as a “satanic alliance”**’ although Turkey points out that
“Special Policy Forum Report: Reflections on Turkish-Israeli Relations and Turkish Security,” 
Policywatch, No:422, 5 November 1999.
Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, “Changing Relations: Turkish-Israeli-Arab Triangle,” Perceptions, 
March-May 2000, p.l35.
Jeremy Salt,‘Turkey’s Military Democracy,” Current History, Vol.98 Iss.625 (February 1999), 
p78.
115 “jyj.j^ey Israel Are No Threat to Iran,” AP, 18 January 2000.
116 “jurkey-Israel Alliance and Arab Policy Towards Turkey,” Arabic News, 15 September 1998, 
<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Dailv/Dav/980915/1998Q91528.html> (5 May 1999).
The writer of this thesis travelled Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in summer 1997 and saw this phrase in 
some newspapers and magazines. See also Dış Basında Tûrkiye-lsrail Askeri İşbirliği Anlaşmasına
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the Turkish-Israeli military agreements are similar to ones that Turkey has signed 
with various countries** ,^ including a number of Arab states.
Some newspapers and magazines in the Arab countries depicted the 
relationship among Turkey, Israel and the USA as a “satanic triangle”. According 
to Arabic media, the dangers of the Turkish-Israeli developing ties are clear and the 
ramifications are long term. They claimed that once such an alliance takes hold, it 
would do untold damage to Arab states’ interests. More money and resources will 
have to be wasted (as usual) on buying weapons to deal with this new threat, which 
will slow down the rate of political, social, and economic progress for the Arab states 
as a whole. One journalist also added that “some Arab states may find temporary 
benefits from this alliance as the US dangles economic carrots to some in the hope 
that they will turn a blind eye, buying time for the alliance to develop. But the threat
is clear.’,120
Some radicals in Arab media also claimed that the US ‘dual containment’ 
policy against Iraq and Iran failed and that the US needs to maintain a balance of 
power in the region that is favorable to its goals. The Turkish-Israeli alliance, they 
say, has served the US interests by squeezing Iran, Iraq, Syria and other regional
countries 121
Tepkiler (5 Nisan-6 Mayıs 1996), Ankara: TC Başbakanlık Basm-Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel 
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From this radical Arab viewpoint, the Turkish-Israeh military agreements 
have larger geopolitical and geostrategic objectives, and its regional implications are 
quite serious. Since the exercises of Israel and Turkey enable both air forces to 
become familiar with the procedures and tactics used by their counterparts, this could 
greatly facilitate cooperation in wartime. Therefore, this ‘alliance’ must not be 
allowed to develop, and a comprehensive strategy should be developed to deal with 
it. Most Arabs think that if this alliance is not prevented in an effective matter from 
developing, the Arab states may face a monster^ that will once again attempt to 
prevent their development.
3.3. Reflections in the Middle East
‘Theoretically speaking the Arabs had three different ways of fighting what 
they called the alliance: forming a counter alliance, bringing Turkey into an alliance 
with them to the exclusion of Israel, or bringing pressures to bear on Turkey to break 
off its alliance with Israel. None of these has succeeded or even seriously 
followed.”'^ ·^  The Turkish-Israeli relations have generated new rapprochements in 
the Middle East. Syrian-Iraqi relations have improved; Iran signed a series of trade 
agreements with Syria; and Iran’s relations with Egypt improved.Despite  these 
steps, “the Middle Eastern response to Turkish-Israeli relations features much 
verbosity but very little action.”^^ ^
‘Turkey-Israel Alliance and Arab Policy Towards Turkey,” Arabic News, 15 September 1998. 
Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, ‘The Turkish-Israeli Alignment,” Security Dialogue, Vol.31, 
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The Israeli-Turkish relationship has contributed to potential change in the 
region and the effects of these developing ties can be seen across the Middle East. 
The regional states most critical of Turkish-Israeli relations are Syria, Iran, and Iraq. 
These states are also the three regional countries with whom Israel is most 
concerned. Turkey’s Middle Eastern relations are also centered on its political, 
ideological, territorial, and geographical disputes with these three states.
3.3.1. Syria
Syria has lost its superpower patron after the end of Cold War and its 
economy is in need of support. In addition, as Şükrü Elekdağ pointed out “Turkey 
has a clear superiority over Syria as regards a comparison of the two countries armed 
forces.”*^ ’
Syria opposed the rapprochement between Israel and Turkey because its 
impact was both on its northern and southern fronts. According to Syria, Turkish- 
Israeli cooperation was “not only against Syria alone, but against the entire Arab 
world”*^® or all the M u s l im s .T h e  Syrian Vice President, Abdülhalim Haddam, 
described the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement as “the greatest threat to the Arabs since 
1 9 4 8 » 130 Military Education and Cooperation Agreement of 1996, Syria’s
Al-Ba’th newspaper claimed “the unannounced alliance aims not only at burying the
Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 Vt War Strategy,” Perceptions, V ol.l N o.l, March-May 1996, p.51 
“Syrian Official Says Turkish-Israeli Alliance Has Serious Effects in the Region,” SWB ME/2945 
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peace process but also at achieving new gains at the expense of the Arabs and their 
legitimate rights.”’^ '
Syria initiated diplomatic contacts with Iraq and Iran to counterbalance 
Turkey in mid-1997. It opened borders with Iraq, and signed a military cooperation 
agreement with Iran.*^  ^ Iraq also expressed its willingness to ally itself strategically 
to Syria. The rapprochement among Syria, Iraq, and Iran was approved by Russia, 
too.*^  ^ In September 1997 Turkey undertook an operation in Northern Iraq and this 
was simultaneously protested by Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Russia, Although Turkish 
operations in Northern Iraq started before Turkish-Israeli cooperation came to the 
fore, they were perceived as an Israeli phenomenon that takes its roots from the 
Israeli operations in Lebanon. The Syrian, Iraqi, and the Iranian governments linked 
Turkish operations in Northern Iraq to the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement.* '^*
In July 1998, Syria’s military Chief of Staff Ali Aslan said that the ‘Turkish- 
Israeli alliance is aimed at controlling the Arab nation, threatening its national 
security and exerting pressure on Arabs in general and Syria in particular to accept 
expansionist Israeli plans,” From the Syrian point of view, encirclement of Syria 
lies at the heart of this growing alliance.
In May 1998, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel declared that Syria was 
agitating other Arab and Muslim capitals against Turkish-Israeli ties, although he
Turkish Probe, 16 May 1997, p.l3.
“Israeli Radio Comments on Syrian Vice-presidents visit to Iran,” SWB ME/2950 MED/3 No.7, 20 
June 1997.
133 “Syrian-Iraqi-Iranian Rapprochement in Light of Israeli-Turkish Alliance Viewed,” SWB ME/2951 
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added that such actions would not affect the relationship between Turkey and 
Israel .Mainly  at Syrian instigation, Arab League gatherings in recent years have 
often denounced Turkish-Israeli relations, Turkish water policy*^’, and Turkish 
operations in Northern Iraq. Although Syria led the campaigns for condemnation of 
Turkey, other Arab states tried to tone down the wording of the condemnations to 
avoid break with Ankara.’^ *
As long as Syria makes territorial claims on Turkey and its support continues 
at any form, it is apparent that it will be difficult to improve Turkish-Syrian relations. 
For example, Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk Al-Shara complained, “Israel and 
Turkey insist on defining resistance movements as terrorists as well. In citing 
excuses such as the PKK and the opposition movement in Southern Lebanon, 
respectively, Israel and Turkey attempt to present all armed movements as terrorism. 
Syria cannot accept this.” '^  ^ Therefore, terrorism linked to Syria remains an 
important factor blocking the peace in the Middle East.
As a close neighbor, Turkey has observed the evolution of the Middle East 
peace process with interest because an Israeh-Syrian peace would entail dramatic 
changes to the strategic picture of the Middle East. Çevik Bir claimed, “If there is a 
peace agreement between Israel and Syria, it would be a result of the agreement
Alan Makovsky, ‘Turkey, Syria, and the Kurdish Dilemma; Defusing the Turkish-Syrian Crisis, 
Whose Triumph?” Middle East Insight, January-February 1999, p.l6.
Turkish Press Review, 7 May 1998.
Formal Declaration of the Arab League summits accuse Turkey of “using water as a weapon” 
against the Arabs. See Mustafa Kibaroğlu, ‘Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The 
Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), p.40.
Suriye Krizi ve Dünya Basım (Ankara, TC Başbakanlık Basm-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel 
Müdürlüğü, 1998).
Interview in El-Safır (Lebanon), 20 November 1995.
46
between Turkey and Israel.”*'*® However, it can be predicted that an Israeli-Syrian 
peace will affect the Turkish-Israeli relations and the developing atmosphere of 
friendship and cooperation between the two countries because an Israeli-Syrian 
peace will negate at least some of Israel’s reasons for military ties with Turkey. On 
the other hand, given the historical context of Israel’s relations with the regional 
states, it will be a long time before any type of warm peace developments between 
Syria and Israel.
The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and its impact on the Syrian- 
Israeli negotiations became a heated debate. Before the death of Syrian President 
Hafez al-Asad, his son Bashar al-Assad stated that Israel is committing a mistake if it 
thinks its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon is equivalent to peace with Syria. 
Although he welcomed Israel's intention to withdraw from south Lebanon, he warned 
Israel that its withdrawal would not hide the many problems which are still pending 
in the peace process, especially the Syrian demand that Israel has to return back the 
whole of the Syrian Golan.*'**
Without Syrian acquiescence, Israel can never become fully integrated into 
the Middle East. In addition to this, Israel’s relationship with Syria is very important 
for the security of Israel because it shares a border with Israel. Syria has historically 
been able to do most physical damage to the Jewish state. There is a mistrustfril 
atmosphere between these two states and there have always been tensions in the 
border. Although Syria is implacable enemy of Israel, the military balance of power
“Special Policy Forum Report: Reflections on Turkish-Israeli Relations and Turkish Security,” 
PoUcywatch, No:422, 5 November 1999.
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is in favor of Tel Aviv.*“*^ Syrians are very much aware the fact that their military 
hardware is outmoded and old. Syrians also thinks that the Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement is a means of putting pressure on Syria. Damascus fears that Israel 
may have the use of Turkish territory in any armed conflict with Syria.
In short, in terms of its relevance to Syria, Turkish-Israeli rapprochement is 
meant to warn Damascus to avoid any regional adventures. It serves as a deterrent to 
any hostile action from Syria. As Çevik Bir argues, the military agreement signed 
between Turkey and Israel “paved the way for the resolution of the Turkish-Syrian 
crisis of Autumn 1998. Syria’s more responsive attitude toward Turkey since then 
proves that the Turkish-Israeli agreement works.”'"*^
3.3.2. Iran
Turkey has had uneasy relations with the fundamentalist regime in Iran, 
which it suspects of supporting terrorists inside Turkey*'*'* and from which it has 
experienced political rivalry in Central Asia. The principal problem Turkey has with 
Iran is its hostility toward secularism, which Turkey sees as a threat to its own 
secular establishment.
Iran has shown no signs of joining in the peace process, and is continuing to 
support terrorist groups that are fighting against Israel.*'*  ^ On the other hand, Tel 
Aviv and Ankara are greatly concerned about Iran’s potential to produce weapons of
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998-1999 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1998).
“Special Policy Forum Report: Reflections on Turkish-Israeli Relations and Turkish Security,” 
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mass destruction. The exact size of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains unknown 
and Iran is in the process of attempting to acquire long-range ballistic missiles. Iran 
is also widely believed to be pursuing a nuclear weapons programme.*'*^
Iran’s reaction to the 1996 Military Training Cooperation Agreement was 
very negative, at all levels. It was denounced as an American-Israeli attempt to 
encircle Iran. In addition, during the Eight Summit of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference in Tehran, 9-11 December 1997, Hashemi Rafsanjani condemned 
Ankara’s behavior as hostile to Arab and Muslim interests in his speech.*'*’
Iran and Syria hoped to deepen their strategic ties against Turkish-Israeli ties. 
Syrian President Hafez al-Asad visited Tehran on 31 July-1 August 1997. This 
illustrated the importance to Syria of such ties because it was Asad’s second such 
visit since the Iranian revolution. (The first one was after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in September 1990.)*'*® Syria needs close relations with Iran and this visit 
confirmed the depth of the relations between the two countries.
Iran strongly reacted to the joint maneuvers conducted by Turkey, US and 
Israel in the Mediterranean Sea in January 1998. A newspaper article claimed, 
‘Turkey which has turned its back towards its Muslim brothers and neighbors has 
opted for cooperation with Israel, thereby endorsing the Zionist aggression and their
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1997/98 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 168.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995/96 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp.l22 and 125; “Russia: Specialists to Train Iranians for Bushehr Nuclear
Plant,” FBlS-SOV-96-057, 22 March 1996, p.l4.
Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), ME/3112 MED/17, 30 December 1997.147
Alain Gresh, ‘Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and Their Impact on the Middle East,” Middle East 
Journal Vol.52 No.2 (Spring 1998).
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hostilities against the Palestinians in particular and the Muslim world in general.”'''  ^
About the Reliant Mermaid 99, Iranian media said that “Joint maneuvers with the 
Zionist regime will bring no benefit to the nations of the region except instability, 
threat to the region and creation of an atmosphere of mistrust.” '^ ® They thought that 
the USA was using the maneuvers as a means to bring Turkey and Israel closer 
together while trying to calm the Islamic world’s fears by portraying them as a sea 
rescue operation.*^* Iranian media also claimed that the active military cooperation 
between Israel and Turkey is a predetermined move to subdue the countries of the 
region.
From the Iranian point of view, no Muslim country should have ties with the 
Jewish state. Tehran has had deep concerns over Ankara’s growing ties with Israel 
and believed that Turkish-Israeli relations are carried out under the guidance and 
direction of the United States. Naturally, Iran views the rapprochement negatively, 
and this has served to enhance Iranian suspicions of Turkey. Although Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem assured his Iranian counterpart Kamal Kharrazi that “it 
is not possible for any foreign force, including Israel, to adopt any hostile acts toward 
any of our neighbors from our territory,” Tehran fears that Turkish-Israeli 
cooperation has brought Israel to its border and the Jewish state can use the Turkish 
territory to attack her.
“Iranian Security Considerations in the Wake of Joint Manouveres of Turkey, US and Israel,” 
Tehran Times, 13 January 1998.
‘Turkish-Israeli Maneuvres Threaten Region, Iranian Media,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 
December 1999.
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‘Turkey Says Ties with Israel Are No Threat to Iran,” AP, 18 January 2000.
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3.3.3. Iraq
Iraq is clearly no friend of Israel. Both Turkey and Israel supported the anti- 
Iraq coalition in the Gulf War. During the war, Iraq opened the second front by 
sending its Scud missiles to Israeli territory. The Gulf War destructed Iraq’s military 
but Saddam’s desires continue to play a major role in the region’s political future. 
Therefore, Saddam poses a threat to both countries. Iraq believes that Israel is a 
foreign presence in the Middle East and has rejected the peace process with Israel.
Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, Iraqi Foreign Minister, condemned the ReUant 
Mermaid maneuvers as “a provocative act against the Arab nation.” Before the 
maneuvres, Babel (a daily run by Saddam’s elder son Uday) urged Arab states to 
take a firm stand against Turkey over its military cooperation with Israel and their
joint naval exercises. 154
Iraq has also used the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) as a 
platform to raise grievances against Turkey. A draft resolution was presented before 
the Eight Summit of the OIC in Tahran, 9-11 December 1997. It stressed the need to 
“respect the territorial integrity of Iraq,”*^  ^ in a reference to frequent Turkish cross- 
border operations.
According to Ofra Bengio and Gencer Ozcan, “Iraq vehemently attacked 
Turkey for its centuries-old hostility to the Arabs and Arabism. More tangibly, it 
warned of the strategic depth Israel has gained in Turkey, thus enabling it to attack
Turkish Probe, 5 September 1997.
“Iraq Urges Arab States to Take Firm Stand Against Turkey,” Tehran Times, 5 January 1998.
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Iraq and complete the strategic encirclement of Syria.” *^  ^ Iraq also perceived the 
Turkish-IsraeU rapprochement as having direct bearing on the situation in Northern 
Iraq.
3.3.4. Egypt
Egypt’s reaction to the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement has been moderate in 
bilateral talks with Ankara, but negative in multilateral Arab and Muslim forums. 
Egypt is skeptical about Turkey’s regional intentions and unhappy to see Israel ease 
its regional isolation.
After the Military Education and Cooperation Agreement in February 1996, 
Amr Musa, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, came to Ankara to inquire about the details of 
the a c c o r d . I n  1998, when it was announced by Israel that an invitation would be 
extended to Egypt to join the sea and air maneuvers, Amr Musa responded angrily: 
‘There has been no invitation and there had better not be one. We regard this as 
untimely, negative and unhelpful to efforts to revive the peace process.”*^  ^ He also 
added that “there was no need to conduct them, this is not a positive step, and should 
have been postponed or abandoned altogether. The development of the Turkish- 
Israeli axis increases regional tensions and complicates the situation, and could fuel a 
serious arms race in the area.’’*^  ^ After the maneuvers, Egypt also claimed that any 
Turkish alliance with Israel would trigger the establishment of a counter-alliance in 
the region.
‘Turkey Criticized Over Military Cooperation with Israel,” The Middle East Times, Issue.50 
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Egypt did not involve itself in an operational effort to counter Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement because it did not feel directly threatened. However, Cairo expressed 
concern about the emergence of a non-Arab axis in the Middle East to affirm its role 
as the Arab world leader. Although Turkey insistently declared that Turkish relations 
with Israel are not against third countries, Egyptian President Mubarak stated that his 
country “was still not satisfied that the Turkish-Israeli military accord was a mere
training agreement and had innocent motives.’>160
On the other hand, Israeli-Egyptian relations are not distanced contrary to 
popular perception. Especially when compared with Egypt’s ties to other neighboring 
states, Egyptian-Israeli relations are quite normal. For example, Egypt receives 
considerable Israeli investments; and Israel is Egypt’s second largest trading partner 
in the region. Egypt is also eager to do business with Israel on selling natural gas to 
that country. Egyptian officials were quoted recently as saying that natural gas 
reserves in Egypt could amount to 120 trillion cubic feet (about 3.24 trillion cubic 
meters), enough to meet the country’s domestic needs for 100 years.*^’ The 
Egyptian-Israeli talks on the project are contingent upon the progress of the Middle 
Eastern peace process. The pipeline is designed to provide gas to the Palestinian self- 
rule areas, Jordan, and in the future possibly to Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. About 
Israeli-Egyptian relations, in January 1995, Mubarak reiterated that pragmatism 
motivates Eg)q)t’s relationship with Israel and said, “if I cooperate strategically with 
Israel or anyone else, then it is because I have an interest.”'^ ^
Turkish Probe, 7 June 1996, p.3
“Israel to Revive Talks on Importing Egypt Natural Gas,” Xinhua News Agency, 4 April 2000.
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U.S. support is an important issue in Israeli-Egyptian relations. Both are 
firmly committed to avoid any friction that would threaten continued US aid.^^ 
About 92 percent of the annual US expenditure for security assistance goes to Israel 
and Egypt. Since security aid constitutes about 45 percent of the entire US foreign 
assistance budget, it is a sizable sum.*^  ^ Israel has received annually at least $3 
billion and Egypt has received yearly amounts of about $2.1 billion in security aid.*^  ^
However, Egypt's special status -Washington's most trusted Arab ally- has slipped as 
other Arab states and the Palestinians build their relations with the United States.*^’ 
In addition to this, after the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, Egypt fears 
that there may be a decline in US aid.
3.3.S. Jordan
In January 1998, although Reliant Mermaid sparked concern and anger 
among Arab states, Jordan sent an observer (Naval Brigaider Hussein Khasawnah) to 
the exercises. The only Arab state not to condenm the exercise was Jordan. “We are 
sending an observer, we are not participating in maneuvers, this is totally different,” 
said Jordanian Foreign Minister Fayez al-Tarawnah and added, “If there are other 
parties with different views we respect this, but they have to read and understand 
why we are attending.” Tarawnah also said the Turkish invitation to Jordan to 
attend as an observer meant that others were being invited to come and see the
Kenneth W. Stein, “Egyptian-Israeli Relations,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 
Journal, Vol.l Iss.3 (September 1997).
Duncan L. Clarke, “US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable,” The 
Middle East Journal, Vol.51 No.2 (Spring 1997), p.200.
Ibid, p.201 and Fawaz A. Gerces, “Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.74 
No.3 (May-June 1995), p.78.
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54
objectives of the exercises. Iran and Syria publicly condemned Jordanian statements 
and Syrian official papers described them as strange and violating Arab and Islamic 
decisions.
On the other hand, opposition parties in Jordan criticized the government on 
the grounds that “such a step is a partnership step in military, imperialist alliances 
hostile to the Arab and Islamist nations.” ‘These maneuvers give the moral, 
political, and military support to the Zionist entity (Israel) and the Jordanian 
participation, whatever its size or shape, contradicts the principles of our Arab and 
Islamic nation,”'^  ^ the parties said.
King Abdullah, the son of King Hussein, has adopted a policy of ‘peace 
abroad’. He seems to have pursued strategy of ‘no allies, no enemies’. While 
maintaining the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, King Abdullah seemed to want to 
build his credentials in the Arab world so that he has the room to maneuver in the 
future. He did not want to begin his reign with the label of ‘Arab Zionist’, as his 
father was widely perceived in the Arab world. About the Jordan-Israeli relations he 
hopes “Israelis see that their interests are best served when Jordan improves its 
relations with Arab states, as Israeli’s gateway to the Arab world could be through
Amman. ,172
Suleyman al-Khalidi, “Jordan to be Observer at Israel-Turkey Exercises,” Reuters World Report, 5 
January 1998.
For example, Syrian official newspaper Ath-Thawra said that Anunan’s decision was strange 
because the maneuvers are directed against Arabs and Muslims. Therefore any form of participation in 
these maneuvres is undesirable. Ath-Thawra, 3 January 1998.
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Eager to receive financial and military aid from the West, Jordan can gain 
much from its approving posture regarding the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Although 
Arab capitals were displeased with her position both Turkey and Israel have 
expressed their appreciation for his moderate stance on Turkish-Israeli relations.
3.3.6. Others
While Turkish-Israeli links are shrouded with mystery and have enraged 
many Arabs, there are also some Arabs who realize the need to come to terms with 
such important neighbors, Turkey and Israel. For example, some Arabs admitted that 
all Arab countries failed to support Turkey’s efforts to ensure the rights of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus and did not recognize the establishment of a new state 
in Northern Cyprus. According to them, both Turkey and the Arabs can work jointly 
to rectify the erroneous image and reach common understanding. A Yemen 
journalist, for example, points out that both Turks and Arabs may focus on the things 
they share, rather than on the issues in which they have differences. She believes that 
“we have lots of opportunities to make or break Arab-Turkish relations” and
concludes “lets make them, not break them.’.174
Not all Arab states are critical on the Turkish-Israeli cooperation. In addition 
to Jordan, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states have been mostly mum. 
Kuwait and the UAE (United Arab Emirates) are sufficiently content with Ankara to 
host Turkish submarine visits in January 1998. Al-Ahram Strategic Report 1997, a 
widely read strategic document in the Arab world, came to the conclusion that the 
Turkish-Israeli military agreement has not reached the level of a strategic alliance.
“US, Israel, and Turkey To Participate in Exercise Reliant Mermaid,” DefenseLlNK News No.230, 
22 December 1997.
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İsmail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister, quoted this conclusion in negotiations with 
Egyptian officials in March 1998.*’^
However, Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel has inevitably generated 
considerable suspicion amongst Muslim states. The resolutions passed at the 
Organization of Islamic Conference meeting in Tehran on 9-11 December 1997 
demonstrated that MusUm states were far from convinced by Turkey’s insistence 
that ties with Israel would not affect its relations with other states in the region. 
However,
Once the alignment became a fait accompli, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and 
others sought to manipulate it for their own purposes: Egypt, for 
promoting its role as a mediator between Turkey and the Arab countries; 
Syria, for reducing the Turkish threat and strengthening Arab backing 
for its tough stand vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli peace process, and Iraq for 
mobilizing all-Arab support to its cause and breaking out of its isolation. 
Stressing the Turkish-Israeli challenge, it was hoped, could become an 
important means for reconciliation between long-standing enemies or
rivals such as Syria and Iraq, or Iraq and Iran or even Iran and Egypt 176
3.4. Reflections in Greece, the USA, Russia, and Central Asia 
3.4.1. Greece
Relations with Greece constitute one of the most important aspects of Turkish 
Foreign Policy. Both neighboring countries are NATO allies, associates in the EU, 
share the same geography and the common democratic values of the Western world. 
Despite these realities, the improvement of the Turkish-Greek relations has been 
hostage to the longstanding bilateral problems for a long time.*^’
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It can be claimed that before the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement there was a 
Greek policy of encircling Turkey. Greece signed an agreement with Syria in July 
1995, giving the Greek armed forces to Syrian air and naval bases.*’* In 1996, Greek 
Defense Minister Gerasimos Arsenis reportedly called upon his government to boost 
ties with Turkey’s neighbors for the sake of coordinating anti-Turkish policies. After 
the military agreements between Turkey and Israel, Greek president, foreign minister 
and defense minister visited Armenia in June 1996. During the visit, agreements on 
health, transports and public order were signed as well as another one on defense 
cooperation. A cooperation group among Greece, Armenia and Iran -countries 
having similar principles as described by Greek foreign minister Pángalos- was 
discussed. Greek Defense Minister Arsenis commented on this agreement as a part of 
Greece’s “programme of military diplomacy and cooperation with countries in the 
wider region.’’****
In June 1997, Greece and Armenia signed another agreement “regarding the 
exchange of military intelligence and expanding a joint operation program.’’*** In 
December 1997, Iran, Greece, and Armenia signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
intended to pave the way for long-term cooperation in economic and commercial 
areas.**’ On 28 June 1999, the Greek Defense Minister visited Tehran and he claimed
Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal, Vol.52, No;l, 
Winter 1998, p.35.
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that a defense agreement was going to be finalized between the two countries. 
Two weeks later, the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Greece and Iran met in Athens 
with their counterpart from Armenia for one in a series of annual meetings. In 
September 1999, the three foreign ministers met in Athens to sign agreements on a 
number of economic topics.**^
During the ‘Reliant Mermaid’, twelve Arab ambassadors in Athens urged 
Greece not to participate in a joint military exercise with Israel. Greek Foreign 
Minister Theodoros Pángalos said that the maneuvers were openly provocative and 
added that he had intimated the concern of his government to Washington about 
those naval operations.
In September 1998, Greek National Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos 
said Ankara and Jerusalem’s axis policy was worrying Greece, and underlined the 
necessity to set up a regional security system with participation of all Eastern 
Mediterranean countries.*®’ “We have nothing against Turkey-Israel economic 
relations, despite the fact that these include the supply of armaments”, the Greek 
Defense Minister told the German newspaper “Suddeutche Zeitung”.*®® He added 
that when Israel’s advanced technology is made available to Turkey, with Ankara’s 
objective being to use it aggressively, then this goes beyond the limits.
Andrew I. Killgore and John P. Nordin. “Consequences of the Israeli-Turkey Alliance,” 
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Tsohatzopoulos also claims that Israeli fighter jets together with Turkish warplanes 
have repeatedly flown above Cyprus.
Greek military is no match for the Turkish army’*^  and the military 
agreements between Turkey and Israel help ensure the Turkey’s military superiority 
over Greece. Greece is concerned that the Turkish-Israeli military and intelligence 
ties might eventually be used against it. Greece’s difficult bilateral relations with 
Turkey are largely responsible for its negative reaction to the Turkish-Israeli 
relations. Although Greek-Israeh relations have never been warm, Tel Aviv has no 
quarrel with Greece.
3.4.2. The USA
The United States has welcomed the rapprochement between the two 
democracies in the Middle East. The United States has been supportive stating that 
enhanced relations between Turkey and Israel contribute to regional peace and 
security. “ We think that Israel’s integration into the region is part and parcel of what 
we think needs to happen in order for there to be an overall settlement of the Middle 
East problem. So that is something that obviously we have been encouraging for 
quite some time now,”*^® State Department spokesman James Fully said. At a US 
State Department briefing in June 1997, spokesman Nicholas Bums stated that the 
United States fully supports the efforts of Turkey and Israel to become friends.
Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 '/2  War Strategy,” Perceptions, March-May 1996, p.39 and The International 
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The United States cannot be unhappy with the Turkish-Israeli developing ties, 
as the dominant external power in the Middle East. Both Turkey and Israel have 
close relationships with the United States. With this rapprochement, Israel did not 
intend to replace the United States and Europe in their relationship to Turkey, and 
Turkey is not looking to substitute itself in place of the US in terms of American- 
IsraeU relations. Closeness between Turkey and Israel allows for both countries to 
supply much of each other’s needs without necessarily giving up any goals.
Although the United States officially denies that it played any direct role in 
bringing these two states together, Eqbal Ahmad, emeritus professor of Middle East 
Studies at Hampshire College, claims, “It seems an impossibility that two principle 
US allies could form a bilateral alliance without the US playing a matchmaking role. 
There is a long history of the US trying to find strategic allies in the Middle East who 
would play deputy to American power.’’*^* Jennifer Wasburn claims that Israeli 
Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai explicitly confirmed the US role by saying “I 
certainly describe the relationship between us and the Turks as the development of a 
strategic relationship. All this with the backing and coordination of the US.”’^ ^
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and balistic missiles is also 
of concern for the United States. A strong Turkish-Israeli relationship could serve 
as a vehicle through which American concerns might be safeguarded in that subject.
Jennifer Washburn, “Power Bloc: Turkey and Israel Lock Arms,” The Progressive Magazine, 
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3.4.3. Russia
After the ‘Reliant Mermaid’, Russians said the maneuvers could aggravate 
mistrust and handicap efforts to bring stability to the region. According to Russians, 
the exercises would undermine the Middle East peace process and pave the way to 
reciprocal polarization in the region. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady 
Tarasov said, ‘The exercises are a step towards establishing a Turco-Israeli axis 
against the interests of the Arab countries in the region.” He added that ‘‘carrying 
out such an exercise in such a sensitive region as the eastern Mediterranean would 
further widen the confidence gap and cripple efforts for overcoming the deadlock in 
the Mideast peace process.”*’  ^ In response to these maneuvers, Russians called for 
joint exercises between themselves, Iran and Syria.
The Russian presence and influence in the Middle East have declined 
dramatically in the past ten years. Today, Russia’s main interest is in making money 
by selling arms in the region. Although economic constraints prevent Russia from 
challenging the US hegemony in the region, Russia responded to the Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement by itself developing closer relations with Iran and Syria.
3.4.4. Central Asia and the Caucasus
In the 1990s, Central Asia has been witnessing an increased interest from 
both the political and business communities of the world. Israel also wants to 
develop economic and political ties with these countries. Israel’s role in the Caucasus
‘Turco-Israeli-US Exercise Continues Successfully as Criticisms Persist,” Turkish Daily News, 7 
January 1998.
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and Central Asia is more important than most analyses would normally 
acknowledge.
While the Caucasus region has turned into a gamble because of its rich 
energy sources, Israel and Turkey have established close relations with two key 
Caucasian states, Georgia and Azerbaijan. While Georgia is a strategic neighbor to 
Turkey and there is a military training agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
Israel was the biggest foreign investor in Georgia in 1998.*^  ^ Azerbaijan opened an 
embassy in Israel and even cooperation in the field of intelligence has taken place 
between Israel and Azerbaijan. Economically Azerbaijan is interested in Israel’s 
technological expertise, while Israel hopes that Azeri oil could reach Israel through 
an underwater pipeline from Ceyhan once the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is realised. 
On the other hand, Iran has repeatedly warned Azerbaijan against pursuing and 
developing its ties to Israel.
All Central Asian and Caucasian states are positively inclined towards 
furthering their links to the West. This has brought certain Caucasus and Central 
Asian states closer to Israel because of its closer relationship with the US. Although 
Israel viewed Turkey as a gateway to these republics, this part of the Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement has not been as successful Israel had hoped.
Israel invested more than $18 million in 1998 while Turkey was the fifth foreign investor by $12 
million. See “Gürcistan’da Yatmm Yapan Başlıca Ülkeler,” Avrasya Dosyası, No. 114, February 
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CONCLUSION
“Our geography makes our history,” one intellectual once said. Surrounded 
by three seas and bridging Europe and Asia, Turkey occupies a unique and 
strategically important location. By virtue of this geopolitical setting, Turkey belongs 
to many regions at the same time and Middle East constitutes one of them.
The Middle East remains a turbulent area where the use of force is still 
considered an option by state leaders. There is a proliferation of missiles and several 
states are in the process of attempting to acquire unconventional weapons of mass 
destruction. The region also contains serious interstate competition and potential 
internal instability which could produce war and crises. This does not seem likely to 
change in the near future, and therefore the increasingly strong links between Israel 
and Turkey do not seem likely to change either. The relations would keep on their 
current promising course and provide security and stability for both states.
Turkey and Israel share a sense of alienation from the Arab world. These two 
countries are also the owners of the region’s most dynamic economies and share 
similar western-oriented liberal, democratic regimes. Turks have also historically 
enjoyed better relations with Jews than with the Arabs. For both Turkey and Israel, 
friendship means that they are no longer alone in a hostile region. This factor provide 
for a basis for the continuation and strengthening of the Turkish-Israeli relations.
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Your friend could be my friend, but your enemy need not be my enemy. That 
is the philosophy that Turkey and Israel applies to their relations with all the 
countries in the region. Israel does not wish to place its relations with other countries 
under the bondage of its ties with Turkey. In the international arena, Tel Aviv would 
certainly continue to give first priority to its own interests and Israel have no wish to 
sacrifice one thing for the other.
The Turkish-Israeli initiative was pragmatic. The main driving force behind 
the relationship emanates from their relations with their regional neighbors. Although 
both Turkey and Israel repeatedly stressed that the cooperation between the two 
countries was not directed at any third party, one of the most important aims of the 
Turkish-Israeli rapprochement is to deter other states (mainly Syria, Iraq, and Iran) 
from taking hostile actions against either Israel or Turkey. On the other hand, 
Turkish-Israeli relationship strengthened the Arab-Israeli peace process, which 
amounts to a reluctant acceptance of Israel as a regional actor by most Arab states.
Turkey is keen to affirm that military cooperation with Israel is only one 
aspect of broader relations between them. According to Ankara and Tel Aviv, mutual 
efforts to further develop and enhance Turkish-Israeli relations should not be seen as 
an action against any other country. However, the official Arab and Muslim reaction 
against Ankara’s growing ties with Israel has generally been negative. Both Israel 
and Turkey use their developing ties to put pressure on their enemies to think twice 
about any hostile actions. This certainly has caught the attention of Damascus,
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Tehran and Baghdad. Syria, Iran and Iraq reconsidered their political and military 
strategies.
While initially Ankara was concerned that improved relations with Israel 
would damage its links with the Arab world, Barry Rubin claims that “at present 
heightened Turkey-Israel relations seem to have little real cost in terms of Turkey- 
Arab relations.”‘^ * As long as regional conditions continue to impart strategic benefit 
to Turkish-Israeli cooperation, these relations are likely to continue. Turkey and 
Israel may be able to play more effective and constructive role in the region and may 
help bring about a more stable and prosperous Middle East. Efraim Inbar argues that 
Turkish-Israeli rapprochement may have also an indirect effect: “encouraging 
démocratisation and the liberalisation of the economies in the region.” He also 
claims that
With all its importance, the Israeli-Turkish entente cannot change the 
strategic map of the Greater Middle East or change dramatically the 
balance of power and the rules of the regional game of international 
politics. The Middle East will remain a tough neighbourhood.^*^
High-level visits between Turkey and Israel continued during last year. In 
November 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ismail Cem, met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Summit in Istanbul and an 
important step concerning the sale of water from Turkey to Israel was taken.^°* On 
27 December 1999, the annual meetings between Turkey and Israel started in Tel
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Aviv. The Turkish delegation was led by Deputy Chief of General Staff Edip Başer, 
while the Israeli delegation was headed by Defense Ministry Director Amos 
Yoran.^ ®^  On 27 January 2000, two F-4 planes, which were upgraded by Israel, were 
handed over to the Turkish Air Force with a ceremony in Eskişehir Province. 
Addressing the ceremony. Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu said the 
instabilities in the region necessitate sufficient power and capability to get rid of 
internal and external threats against Turkey.^®^  Between March 12 and 15, Turkish 
Health Minister Osman Durmuş visited Israel as the guest of his Israeli counterpart 
Solomo Benizri to develop Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the field of health. On 27 
March 2000, Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari, the Israeli Naval Forces Commander, visited 
Admiral Ilhami Erdil, the Naval Forces Commander. Erdil said that the Turkish and 
Israeli naval forces continue their relations in training and technical fields.
In addition to this official visits, famous Turkish pop singer and composer 
Sezen Aksu gave a concert in Israel which was organized by the Turkish-Israeli 
Friendship Association in January 2000. The income that was gained from the 
concert was spent in constructing schools in the earthquake struck region of 
Turkey.^ ”^
Notwithstanding these positive developments, the relations between the two 
countries became strained after two Israeli ministers (Education Minister Yossi Sarid
“Israel and Turkey Discuss Water,” IPR Strategic Business Information Database, 29 November 
1999.
202 “Xurkey-Israel Annual Meetings Start,” Anatolia News Agency, 27 December 1999.
203 army chief hails arrival of two fighter jets upgraded by Israel,” BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 28 January 2000.
204 .“Health Minister Durmuş Returns to Turkey,” Anatolia News Agency, 16 March 2000. 
“Israeli Naval Forces Commander Ya’ari Visits Erdil, Naval Forces Commander,” Ar 
Agency, 27 March 2000.
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and Justice Minister Yossi Beilin) said that ‘Turkey should admit the fact that 
Armenians were massacred ethnically by Turks during the First World War.” °^^  In a 
radio broadcast, Yossi Sarid proposed including accounts of this incident in the 
Israeli high school curriculum. Moreover, Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin said 
the incident in the Ottoman Empire involving Armenians could be called nothing but 
“genocide”.^ ®® The Jewish people living in the U.S. condemned Yossi Sarid. 
Releasing a statement, the Association of American Jewish Friends of Turkey 
(AAJFT) said that Sarid who was defined as an irresponsible person, should be 
dismissed. The statement stressed that all of Muslim, Christian and Jewish people 
suffered grave pains in an atmosphere of war in the Eastern Anatolia Region in the 
last period of Ottoman Empire. The statement also noted that the situation in Eastern 
Anatolia Region had no connection with the genocide.^°^ Israeli Foreign Minister 
David Levy delivered a letter to his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem in an effort to 
make clear Israeli position on the alleged Armenian genocide. Levy reiterated in the 
letter that the Israeli government is clinging to its policy that the alleged Armenian 
Genocide should be discussed by historians, not by politicians or diplomats.^*® Levy 
also stressed that the two ministers' statements on the issue in no way reflected the 
Israeli government's position.^"
On 21 June 2000, Cumhur Ersumer, Minister of Energy and Natural 
Resources of Turkey, declared that Turkey and Israel reached accord over signing an 
agreement pertaining to Israel's purchase of the Manavgat water. Ram Aviram,
‘Turkey, Israel Set to Ease Tensions over Armenian Genocide,” Xinhua News Agency, 18 May 
2000.
208 “7 uj.jjey^  Israel at Odds Over Alleged Armenian Genocide,” Reuters, 11 May 2000.
“Jewish People living in the USA...,” Reuters, 29 April 2000.
“Levy Clarifies Israeli Policy on Alleged Armenian Genocide,” Reuters, 25 May 2000.
Ibid.
6 8
Israeli Foreign Ministry's Waterworks Department Chief, said that the planned water 
purchase consisted of three stages, and added that three stages were “the purchase of 
water from Turkey, its transportation and its transfer to the installations in Israel”.^ ^^  
On the same day, Uri Bar-Ner, Israel's ambassador in Ankara, pointed out that Israel 
was extra sensitive about the water issue, and added that such a sensitive issue could 
only be discussed between good friends.^ The Israelis prefer a port-to-port shipping 
line to a pipeline to be laid under sea.^*''
“An Israeli delegation Due in Turkey,” Anatolia News Agency, 13 June 2000 and ‘Turkish 
Minister Says Accord Reached with Israel on Sale of Water,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 June 
2000.
‘Turkish Minister Says Accord Reached with Israel on Sale of Water,” BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 21 June 2000.
214 ‘Turkey, Israel Reportedly Ready on Water Deal,” Xinhua News Agency, 8 April 2000.
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